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This thesis will provide readers an in-depth analysis of three well-known terrorists in 
order to highlight the role isolation played in their radicalization process.  This thesis 
researched Timothy McVeigh, responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings; 
Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the 2011 massacres in Oslo and Utøya, Norway; 
and Omar Hammami, an American-born individual believed to have been involved in 
numerous terrorist attacks throughout Somalia on behalf of al-Shabaab.  The research 
evaluated both international and domestic terrorists with differing ideologies, and these 
individuals were found to represent a broad spectrum. The thesis specifically evaluated 
whether or not each individual experienced social, emotional, or perceived isolation at 
any point throughout his radicalization process.  It was determined that isolation does 
play a very multifaceted role in both the initial involvement and initial engagement 
phases of radicalization.  By better understanding the contributing factors of 
radicalization, homeland security officials may be better positioned to effectively 
intervene, prevent, or deter radicalization. 
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There has been a limited amount of research conducted on the specific role of social, 
emotional, and perceived isolation on the radicalization process.  The lack of 
representation of isolation in radicalization has created a significant knowledge gap in the 
overall study of terrorism. Numerous models of the radicalization process exist, yet the 
role of isolation has remained neglected. This thesis focuses on whether or not isolation 
played a significant role in an individual’s process towards radicalization. It is important 
to understand the role of isolation in the radicalization process in order to effectively 
counter radicalization and ultimately terrorism.  
Currently, homeland security officials target individuals who are already 
radicalized and may be in the operational phases of conducting or planning an attack.  
Through the operational aspects of homeland security and law enforcement, individuals 
who pose a threat are removed from the equation through apprehension or arrest.  This 
current strategy effectively eliminates individuals who pose an immediate threat; 
however, those individuals are soon replaced by other like-minded individuals intent on 
causing harm, which creates a continuous cycle of threats. Instead, by viewing 
radicalization through a social psychological lens, we may be able to effectively change 
the conditions that contribute to radicalization. By understanding the role that isolation 
plays in radicalization, we are one step closer to understanding the conditions that 
promote radicalization.   
This thesis was based on the analytic assessment of three case studies of 
individuals who have committed acts of terrorism.  In order to conduct these case studies, 
this study relied on the personal experiences of the individuals in order to determine if 
isolation played a role in their radicalization. The case studies of Timothy McVeigh, 
Anders Breivik, and Omar Hammami demonstrate that isolation does have a role in the 
radicalization process.  Each of these individuals experienced isolation throughout his life 
and on the path of radicalization, although each manifested in very different ways.  The 
initial involvement phase of radicalization illustrates that each individual experienced all 
three types of isolation—social, emotional, and perceived isolation. The initial 
 xv 
engagement phase demonstrated that each individual was isolated out of necessity, as 
means to hide operational activities in preparation for an attack and in order to hide their 
true intentions by establishing a “parallel life.”   
The concept of isolation is multifaceted and multi-dimensional. This thesis 
demonstrates that isolation can manifest in multiple ways and have numerous outcomes. 
It can be self-imposed or forced upon individuals, resulting in differing outcomes.  Peer 
rejection, the inability to connect with peers and family, and the perceived lack of support 
from others, all has drastic effects on individuals—demonstrating the negative aspects of 
forced isolation. However, isolation does not always have negative connotations.  Many 
people who isolate themselves do so for creative, spiritual, and other constructive 
reasons. Consider artists, writers, or monks who have isolated themselves for clarity and 
positive reasons. However, when isolation was forced on the individuals in the case 
studies, it had an impact on them and drastically altered their perspective on life. Isolation 
played a role in the opportunities these individuals felt they had available to them. Peer 
rejection, or fear of rejection, also altered the way in which they viewed their life and 
future. In addition, lack of physical or emotional connections with others impacted the 
support network they felt they had available to them. The need to belong to a group and 
the existential need to relate to others also impacted the decisions they made.   
This thesis is not intended to argue that isolation is a cause of radicalization; 
rather, its intent is to use the case studies of McVeigh, Breivik, and Hammami to 
demonstrate that isolation was a contributing factor in their radicalization. Isolation 
cannot be used as a standalone concept. Isolation in itself is not a sufficient cause of 
radicalization. However, isolation in conjunction with individual and situational 
determinants may have an effect on the path an individual chooses to take. Many people 
are isolated for many different reasons, the majority of whom never enter into the process 
of radicalization.   
It is imperative homeland security officials fully understand isolation and the 
effects it has on an individual and how it affects an individual’s propensity to become 
radicalized. It is also necessary for officials to understand the ability of isolation to 
maintain an individual’s true intentions of committing a terrorist attack.  Through the 
 xvi 
comprehensive understanding of the contributing factors of radicalization, homeland 
security officials will be better positioned to effectively counter radicalization.  This 
research is meant to highlight isolation as a contributing factor to radicalization, not 
prove cause and effect.  By highlighting the importance of isolation, this study has 
highlighted future areas of research that may be valuable in establishing predisposing risk 
factors of isolation. By focusing on intervention and preventative measures in regard to 
isolation, it may be possible to ultimately prevent radicalization and terrorism. By 
viewing radicalization as a complex process that encompasses both individual and 
situational factors, we can attempt to determine how and why individuals move from 
seemingly normal backgrounds to committing acts of terror.  This social psychological 
viewpoint is beneficial in understanding how individuals move toward a path of violence.  
Studying human behavior and understanding the motivation behind committing acts of 
violence can be beneficial in not only terrorism research, but it may also provide insight 
into individuals other than terrorists who act through violence (school shooters, mass 
murders, etc.).  
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I. THE ROLE OF ISOLATION IN RADICALIZATION: 
HOW IMPORTANT IS IT? 
A. THE PROBLEM 
Thesis Statement: 
This thesis explores whether social, emotional, and perceived isolation is a 
contributing factor in terrorist radicalization. The varying and sometimes 
conflicting opinions on radicalization have left counter terrorism officials 
with the difficult task of finding a comprehensive and effective 
mechanism to prevent terrorism. This research is an attempt to provide a 
greater understanding of the contributing factors of radicalization by 
evaluating the role of isolation. Radicalization is a complex multifaceted 
concept; the comprehension of which can then be utilized to impact the 
prevention of radicalization and ultimately terrorism.  
Why do some individuals radicalize and others do not? How do seemingly normal 
individuals arrive at the decision to commit an act of terror? What are the contributing 
factors of radicalization and what kind of role does isolation play in the phenomena? 
Numerous theories on radicalization have been posed in an attempt to explain the 
motivating factors; however, the role of isolation remains neglected. Various disciplines 
provide useful behavioral explanations, such as sociology, psychology and social 
psychology, although sometimes providing contradictory results. Numerous theoretical 
frameworks also exist but do not explore the role of isolation.  
What kind of role does isolation play when an individual becomes increasingly 
dedicated to the terrorist morality and commits an act of terror? Does isolation contribute 
to the process in any way? If so, what is the extent of its influence? These unanswered 
questions reflect a significant knowledge gap in the overall study of terrorism. This thesis 
will examine radicalization as a social psychological process, encompassing both 
individual and societal influences, in an attempt to further understand the motivating 
factors, specifically isolation. Contributing to the overall study of radicalization may 
provide counter terrorism officials the opportunity to utilize a new perspective on 
prevention strategies. An expansive body of literature exists—all offering differing 
opinions on the process of radicalization and the subsequent approaches to counter it. 
 1 
Without first understanding the varying opinions and understanding all of the 
contributing factors to this phenomena, counter terrorism officials will struggle in 
effectively intercepting individuals who are intent on causing harm. 
B. TERRORISM VERSUS RADICALIZATION 
Currently, two broad range approaches exist to countering the threat of terrorism. 
The first school of thought argues counterterrorism efforts should focus on countering 
terrorism, not the radicalization process.  In his work The Problem with Radicalization, 
author Anthony Richards, assesses that the lack of clear guidance on the radicalization 
process has created confusion with those who are tasked with counterterrorism 
responsibilities. Adding, that a person involved in terrorism should undeniably be a 
concern to homeland security officials, while a radicalized individual may not necessarily 
be of concern.1  While valid points are made in Richards’ argument, if homeland security 
officials focus on studying the radicalization process we may be able to provide 
opportunities for early intervention.   
As author David Canter points out in his work The Faces of Terrorism, studying 
terrorism faces several challenges. For example, when studying terrorists, the only 
individuals available to interview are those who have been captured or detected, many 
times through their failures to reach their desired goals.2  These individuals may not 
adequately represent their counterparts who successfully reached their goals of 
committing violent acts.  This poses a challenge in obtaining accurate information as the 
individuals’ accounts may be distorted as they view their own failures and their current 
incarcerated status.3 Regardless of these challenges, these individuals offer insight 
(however biased) into how individuals radicalize and can afford the opportunity for 
additional research into the overall process. 
1Anthony Richards, “The Problem with ‘Radicalization:’ The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the Need to 
Refocus on Terrorism in the UK,” International Affairs 87, no. 1 (2011): 143–144.  
2David V. Canter, The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 3–4. 
3 Ibid. 
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The second school of thought assesses that determining the root causes of 
terrorism should focus on the radicalization process alone.  In Fighting Radicalism, Not 
‘Terrorism:’ Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, the author postulates the 
focus on radicalization will help fight the conditions that create terrorism and will more 
accurately reflect the political and ideological dimensions of the threat.4 Looking at 
radicalization will allow for early intervention and by viewing it this way, we are 
afforded the opportunity to use non-coercive measures.5Additionally, the author points 
out that while all terrorists are radicals, not all radicals elevate to the level of terrorism.  
Therefore, it is important to focus on radicalization and see it as an opportunity to prevent 
terrorism at an early stage.6  
C. DEFINITIONS  
1. Radicalization 
Throughout history, numerous definitions of terrorism have emerged and 
remained in use by various members of law enforcement, the intelligence community, 
and academics alike. These disparate definitions have posed problems in countering 
terrorism. Similarly, numerous governmental and academic definitions of radicalization 
exist.7  Currently, within the United States, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) possess their own definitions.  
The FBI defines radicalization as “the process by which individuals come to believe their 
engagement in or facilitation of nonstate violence to achieve social and political change is 
necessary and justified.”8  The DHS defines it as “The process of adopting an extremist 
belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method 
4 Ömer Taşpınar, “Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terrorism:’ Root Causes of an International Actor 
Redefined,” SAIS Review 29, no. 2 (2009): 76. 
5 Ibid., 77. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Alex Schmid, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion 
and Literature Review (The Hague: International Centre for Counter Terrorism, 2013). 
8 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: 
New York City Police Department, 2007).  
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to effect social change.”9 Although they may appear relatively similar, the DHS 
definition emphasizes the “adoption of an extremist belief system,” while the FBI’s 
definition refers to non-state violence. In his work, Radicalization into Violent Extremism 
I: A Review of Social Science Theories, author Randy Borum defines radicalization as 
“the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs.”10  Another author, Kris 
Christmann, suggests “radicalisation is best viewed as a process of change, a personal 
and political transformation from one condition to another.”11 
The lack of a clear and uniformly accepted definition of radicalization only 
compounds counter terrorism officials’ ability to counter the terrorist threat. Borum also 
argues that the definition of radicalization used by counter terrorism officials should be 
related to strategic outcomes.12  It is important to understand what we are trying to 
counter, before being able to launch an effective plan to defeat it.13 By exploring the role 
of isolation in the radicalization process and exploring the different types of isolation and 
how they affect an individual, we may be able to more adequately understand 
radicalization and offer solutions to counter it. 
2. Definitions of the Types of Isolation 
In order to understand the role that isolation plays in the radicalization process, 
we must first define isolation and explore the different types of isolation. This research 
will address three types of isolation: social, emotional, and perceived isolation. Social 
isolation is defined as social connectedness or an objective measure of contacts with 
9 Schmid, Radicalisation, 12. 
10 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 9. 
11 Kris Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic 
Review of the Research Evidence” (England: Youth Justice Board, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-
extremism-systematic-review.pdf, 10. 
12 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 11. 
13 Ibid. 
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other people.14 Emotional isolation is represented by the subjective degree an individual 
feels emotionally connected with others.  Emotional isolation may also represent “a gap 
between one’s ideal level of social relationships and their actual level of social 
relationships.”15 An emotionally isolated individual may feel distanced and maintain 
difficulty in relating to others. Perceived isolation is a subjective lack of social support 
related to the extent one feels isolated.16 Through the exploration of these varieties of 
isolation and the effects they have on an individual, we may position ourselves to better 
understand how they relate to the radicalization process. In turn, this will afford the 
opportunity to better understand the multifaceted psychological and sociological aspects 
of radicalization.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The critical analysis of the extant of literature focuses on two schools of thought 
that have attempted to examine the root causes of terrorism. The first school of thought 
focuses on the radicalization process and the different views held by researchers 
(sociological, psychological, economic, etc.) and the dynamics associated with an 
individual’s path throughout the process. The second school of thought focuses on social 
psychological factors, such as isolation, contributing to the radicalization process. This 
review serves as an introduction to the current available literature on radicalization and 
isolation. A more in depth analysis of this literature will be provided in the coming 
chapters.  
1. Literature Focusing on Radicalization 
A significant amount of research on radicalization exists.  It is important to note 
that many individuals have conducted research into the radicalization process, adopting a 
diversity of perspectives.  Some view it from a psychological lens, as is the case of John 
14 Betty Havens, Madelyn Hall, Gina Sylvestre, and Tyler Jivan, “Social Isolation and Loneliness: 
Differences between Older Rural and Urban Manitobans,” Canadian Journal on Aging 23 (2004): 129–
140. 
15 Steven Stack, “Marriage, Family and Loneliness: A Cross-National Study,” Sociological 
Perspectives 41, no. 2 (1998): 416. 
16 Erin York Cornwell and Linda J. Waite, “Social Disconnectedness, Perceived Isolation, and Health 
among Older Adults,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 50, no. 1 (2009): 32. 
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Horgan in his piece From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspective from 
Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism. In this, Horgan argues that understanding 
terrorism is a complex psychological process that needs to find clarity through viewing 
terrorism as identifiable behaviors coupled with antecedents. Through this type of lens, 
psychological aspects of terrorism can be more practical and useful than prior attempts of 
psychological understanding of terrorism.17 
Others interpret radicalization with an emphasis on economic factors. For 
example, Alberto Abadie applied a risk variable to address the linkages between 
terrorism and economic and political variables and their effect on terrorism.18 Through 
the risk matrix, Abadie concludes several things: there is limited association between 
terrorism and economic variables (poverty); that countries with intermediate levels of 
political freedom are more prone to terrorism; and that certain geographic factors, such as 
country area, elevation, tropical area and landlock, may favor the presence of terrorism.19   
Other research, such as Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-
Radicalisation Strategy, concludes that radicalization cannot be understood through 
single explanations, and it attempts to provide insight into the causal factors of 
radicalization. The article views radicalization as a collective phenomenon, a process of 
socialization that stems from individual behavior. The authors demonstrate this through 
their categorization of radicalization into external levels, social levels, and individual 
levels.20 An additional sociological approach to radicalization, written by Austin Turk, 
assesses sociological approaches applied to radicalization and the current knowledge 
level on the subject, with the intent of pointing out future research issues.21 Turk’s intent 
17John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on 
Radicalization into Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 
(2008): 81. 
18 Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” The American Economic 
Review 96, no. 2 (2006): 50–56. 
19Ibid. 
20 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, “Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU 
Counter-Radicalisation Strategy,” 2008, Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%207.pdf. 
21 Austin T. Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” Annual Review of Sociology (2004): 271–286. 
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is to address the successes and failures of social control, which have been applied in order 
to counter radicalization. Turk suggests that individuals learn to accept terrorism as a 
course of political action when they feel they cannot defend their beliefs through non-
violent means.22 
Defining the lens in which the research on radicalization will be conducted can 
drastically change the outcome of the research. By addressing radicalization from a social 
psychology standpoint, we attempt to determine the root causes of radicalization and the 
dynamics that affect an individual’s propensity to become radicalized. Numerous 
frameworks in which to view radicalization also exist.  There are several different 
perspectives on radicalization models.  Most depend on the lens, as described above, that 
the researcher views radicalization from.  These models also take different approaches 
such as, phase models, causal factor models, and dynamic models. 
In Towards a Dynamic Model of Terrorist Radicalization, author Clara Volintiru 
argues that terrorist models should be dynamic. Volintiru claims the changing variables, 
such as the context the individual operates in and the relationship between events and the 
individual should be represented in a dynamic model of radicalization that shows a 
reciprocal or dynamic relationship between the two.23 An additional model consisting of 
causal factors can be seen through the work entitled Radicalisation, Recruitment and the 
EU Counter-Radicalisation Strategy.  This model indicates that radicalization consists of 
three dynamics or causal factors that influence radicalization: external, social, and 
individual.24 
Additional models of radicalization, such as that of John Horgan, suggest that the 
radicalization process address at least three distinct phases: becoming involved, being 
involved (engagement), and disengagement.25 Similar models, such as that of the New 
York City Police Department (NYPD), also use the phase model approach to describe an 
22Ibid., 282. 
23 Clara Volintiru, “Towards a Dynamic Model of Terrorist Radicalization” (EIR Working Papers No. 
27, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2010).  
24 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, “Radicalisation,” 10. 
25 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways,” 80. 
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individual’s progression through the radicalization process. NYPD uses four distinct 
phases: pre-radicalization, self-indoctrination, indoctrination, jihadization.26 
Additionally, the Danish Intelligence Service’s (PET) model uses a top-down approach to 
show an external radicalizer plays an important role in influencing the individual through 
a process of changed behavior, the narrowing of social life, and moral hardening.27 This 
is in sharp contrast to that of NYPD, which uses a bottom-up approach meaning that an 
individual begins to explore radical ideas, intensifies his beliefs, and accepts his duty to 
participate in jihad.28 While both of these models use a phase model approach, they differ 
in whether it is a top-down approach or bottom-up approach. Though all of these models 
provide a marginal amount of variation in the phases, they all provide a chronological 
definition of the stage individuals purportedly travel through in the radicalization process. 
The use of the common phases an individual travels through will allow the study of 
isolation and radicalization to focus on the phase and will not require the creation of an 
additional model of radicalization. 
2. Literature Focusing on Social Psychological Factors 
a. Isolation 
Very little of the existing research highlights the role that isolation plays in 
the radicalization process. While an extensive amount of research exists on radicalization 
and isolation as separate phenomena, most do not address the correlation between the 
two. The study of the relationship between the two will provide significant insight for 
homeland security officials when addressing the dynamics and human behaviors that 
affect radicalization.   
A significant amount of research has been conducted from a psychological 
standpoint on the concept of isolation. In Measuring Social Isolation in Older Adults the 
author defines social isolation as living without companionship or social 
26 Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West.” 
27 Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model (The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009), 2. 
28Ibid. 
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connectedness.29 The author suggests an environment of social isolation can lead to poor 
health and lower levels of satisfaction, well-being, and community involvement.30 The 
effects of social isolation, specifically in relation to an individual’s level of personal 
satisfaction, can provide insight into the radicalization process specifically in the first two 
initial phases of radicalization. In some instances, personal satisfaction is related to an 
individual’s perceived grievances or the absence of opportunities relative to an 
individual’s expectations.31 A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the 
concept of relative deprivation and globalization, offering explanations for motivating 
factors in radicalization.   
In Social Disconnectedness, Perceived Isolation, and Health among Older 
Adults, the authors review the effects of social isolation and perceived isolation on older 
individuals’ health.  Their findings show the relationship between isolation and decreased 
physical health and mental health.32  These findings, as they specifically relate to coping 
strategies, self-esteem, depression, and sense of control, may be of particular interest 
when exploring the role of isolation in radicalization.   
In an article entitled “Lonely but Not Alone,” the authors define emotional 
isolation as the absence or loss of an attachment figure, which can only be substituted by 
an additional intimate bond.33 In Introducing Science to the Psychology of the Soul: 
Experimental Existential Psychology, the authors explore the role that isolation has in 
psychological functioning. The authors conclude that an individual has five major 
existential concerns: death, isolation, identity, freedom, and meaning. Isolation, as an 
29 Graeme Hawthorne, “Measuring Social Isolation in Older Adults: Development and Initial 
Validation of the Friendship Scale,” Social Indicators Research 77, no. 3 (2006): 521. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Taşpınar, “Fighting Radicalism,” 78. 
32 Cornwell and Waite, “Social Disconnectedness,” 31–48. 
33 Berna Van Baarsen, Tom A. B. Snijders, Johannes H. Smit and Marijtje A. J. van Duijn, “Lonely 
but Not Alone: Emotional Isolation and Social Isolation as Two Distinct Dimensions of Loneliness in Older 
People,” Educational and Psychological Measurement 61, no. 1 (2001): 119–135. 
 9 
                                                 
existential concern, relates to an individual’s need to feel connected to others and their 
need to be able to fully share subjective experiences with others.34   
The practice of isolation has been utilized by many individuals and groups 
throughout history. Cults, gangs, and military/police interrogations have all utilized 
isolation in order to gain and maintain control over an individual. The explicit role 
isolation plays in cults, gangs and military/police interrogation will be specifically 
addressed in Chapter III. In addition to exploring how isolation has been used in the past 
to exert control, there are additional social psychological factors that are relevant to 
isolation and the radicalization process. These factors include, but are not limited to, the 
need to belong, social identity theory, internet jihad, and charismatic leaders.  These 
additional factors merit attention and understanding. They will be briefly discussed 
below, but greater attention will be paid to their applications throughout the case study 
and analyses portion of this research.  
b. The Need to Belong 
Several theories exist, both recent and historic, explaining an individual’s 
need to belong. This existential need can have profound effects on an individual’s 
motivation to join a group and maintain membership in a group. While many of these 
theories have traditionally been used in psychological or sociological fields, they also 
have implications for terrorism research. The need to belong theory indicates that while 
variations may exist from culture to culture or from individual to individual, nearly all 
humans, to a certain degree, have an innate need to belong.35 The belongingness 
hypothesis contends “that human beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at 
least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships.” 
The attachment theory also emphasizes the need to form and maintain interpersonal  
 
34 Sander L. Koole, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski, “Introducing Science to the Psychology of 
the Soul: Experimental Existential Psychology,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 15, no. 5 
(2006): 213–214. 
35 Roy F. Baumeister and Mark R. Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments 
as a Fundamental Human Motivation,” Psychological Bulletin 117, no. 3 (1995): 499. 
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bonds.36 The evaluation of these theories reveal the premise that individuals have an 
innate need to belong to a group or be accepted can help explain human behavior and the 
motivation to join a group.   
Theories such as social identity theory (SIT) suggest that the need for a 
positive and distinct identity will lead people to join groups.37 SIT can be useful in 
explaining the relationship between an individual and their membership in groups.38 
According to Brannan and Anders Strindberg, “Belonging to a group is a powerful 
determinant of the identities of most individuals.”39 SIT is useful in not only 
understanding the initial motivation for joining a group, but it also explains an 
individual’s continued membership in a group.  SIT proposes that an individual’s “in-
group” must provide a positive sense social identity to their members. If a group fails to 
provide this, members have motivation to leave the group in order to fulfill this need 
elsewhere.  
The desire for interpersonal attachments and an individual’s innate need to 
belong may play several roles in regard to isolation. These theories provide a greater 
understanding of the human motivation behind feeling a sense of acceptance and 
belonging. If an individual is isolated, this may affect his or her propensity to join a 
group—whether that is a legitimate group or a terrorist organization. The theories also 
help explain the ability of an organization to retain membership and control over an 
individual.  These theories can be useful in explaining both “lone wolves” and those who 
act on behalf of terrorist organizations. Understanding these concepts and motivations 
will prove important in understanding an individual’s radicalization into terrorism. Also 
important to note are the mechanisms by which an individual searching for belongingness 
may be recruited.  The following sections will address internet jihad and charismatic 
36 Ibid., 497. 
37 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 95. 
38 David Brannan and Anders Strindberg, Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A 
Handbook for Practitioners (Ventura, CA: Agile Press, forthcoming 2014). 
39Ibid., 32. 
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leaders.  These are not the only means by which an individual becomes radicalized; 
however, they have become growing phenomena in recent years.  
c. Internet Jihad 
The use of the internet may also play a role in isolation and radicalization. 
Extremists and terrorist organizations have used the internet to recruit, spread 
propaganda, train, communicate and fundraise.40 With the growing influence and 
popularity of the internet, those who are isolated now have the ability to reach outside of 
their current surroundings. The use of the internet may fulfill the sense of belonging that 
isolated individuals seek and do not attain elsewhere.  Individuals who use the internet to 
fulfill a sense of belonging, may be inadvertently subject to extremist propaganda or 
specifically targeted by terrorist organizations for recruitment.   
d. Charismatic Leader 
The role of a charismatic leader also plays a multifaceted role in 
radicalization and isolation.  Charismatic leaders have utilized strategies in order to 
maintain control over individuals by making the individuals as dependent as possible on 
the charismatic leader. This dependency is often accomplished through isolating 
individuals and forcing them to cut previously held social ties.41 An additional role the 
charismatic leader may play is in the recruitment process. Emotional isolation is 
sometimes characterized by the absence or loss of an attachment figure, which can only 
be substituted by an additional intimate bond. 42 Subsequently, those suffering from 
emotional isolation may be easily influenced by a charismatic leader, in an attempt to fill 
a void and create a bond that the isolated individual may be missing.  
40 “Jihad Online: Islamic Terrorists and the Internet,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed July 5, 2013, 
http://archive.adl.org/internet/jihad.asp.  
41 Doyle Paul Johnson, “Dilemmas of Charismatic Leadership: The Case of the People’s Temple,” 
Sociological Analysis 40, no. 4 (1979): 316–317. 
42Van Baarsen et al., “Lonely but Not Alone,” 119–135. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, there is substantial research into the topics of radicalization and isolation.  
It is important to address the specific lenses in which these concepts are viewed, 
specifically psychological, sociological, etc. Through the review of the literature, it is 
evident that a significant knowledge gap exists concerning the complex issue of 
radicalization in relation to the concept of isolation.  By viewing radicalization and 
isolation as a complex social psychological dynamic, it allows the opportunity to study 
isolation as a contributing factor of radicalization. In order to prevent and/or counter 
radicalization, we must first understand it. Through a better understanding of the way in 
which isolation works, how it evolves, and how it becomes effective, then we are in a 
better position to prevent radicalization. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II—Methodology 
Chapter II will address different radicalization models; more specifically the 
concept of phase models that are used to describe an individual’s progression towards 
terrorism. This chapter will also outline the methodology of this research, which consists 
of three case studies on known terrorists Timothy McVeigh, Anders Behring Breivik, and 
Omar Hammami. 
Chapter III—Varieties of Isolation 
Chapter III will provide an in depth explanation of three types of isolation: social, 
emotional and perceived isolation. In addition, the chapter will explore the uses of 
isolation throughout history and provide an in depth understanding of the varieties of 
isolation and their relationship to the radicalization process. 
Chapter IV—Case Study on Timothy McVeigh 
Chapter IV will provide a detailed life history of Timothy McVeigh, the 1995 
Oklahoma City bomber, in order to highlight any isolation he may have experienced 




Chapter V—Case Study on Anders Behring Breivik 
Chapter V will explore the childhood and early adult life of Anders Behring 
Breivik in order to highlight any periods of isolation he may have experienced before 
committing the 2011 attacks in Oslo and Utøya, Norway. 
Chapter VI—Case Study on Omar Hammami 
Chapter VI will examine the life of Omar Hammami in order to determine any 
periods of isolation he may have endured before travelling to Somalia and fighting on 
behalf of the terrorist organization, al-Shabaab. 
Chapter VII—Analysis  
Chapter VII will synthesize the analysis conducted throughout the case studies 
and provide an aggregate of the types of isolation experienced throughout their paths to 
radicalization. This will be accomplished through a comprehensive study of the two 
concepts of isolation and radicalization as dynamic social psychological factors.  
Chapter VIII—Conclusion  
Chapter VIII will attempt to provide policy makers, academics and counter 
terrorism officials with a better understanding of how isolation affects an individual in 
the radicalization process. The final chapter will also highlight the importance of 
understanding the contributing factors of radicalization through theoretical and policy 
implications and finally offering suggestions for future research. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
A. CHALLENGES OF LOOKING AT RADICALIZATION 
This thesis focuses on the radicalization process as opposed to terrorism, in an 
effort to determine what role isolation plays in the radicalization process. This research 
has been conducted with the ultimate goal of highlighting a contributing factor to 
radicalization that may provide an opportunity for early intervention or detection. With 
that said, when exploring this phenomena, there are several challenges that researchers 
may face.  It is necessary to explore these challenges so readers, and researchers alike, are 
aware of challenges that may arise when evaluating the process of radicalization. 
In Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terrorism:’ Root causes of an International Actor 
Redefined, the author points out that while all terrorists are radicals, not all radicals 
elevate to the level of terrorism.43 Subsequently, radicalization does not necessarily lead 
to violence.44 As Veldhuis states, “Terrorism is one of the worst possible, but 
nevertheless avoidable, outcomes of violent radicalization.”45 Because radicalization is 
not necessarily a precursor to terrorism,46 counter terrorism officials must decide if 
extremist or radical ideologies matter in the absence of violence.47  
The radicalization process is different for all people at all times.48  People become 
terrorists in many different ways and for many different reasons. In his work The 
Problem with Radicalization, author Anthony Richards explains that there is a lack of 
clarity on radicalization; specifically on what the parameters of radicalization are. This 
lack of clarity has caused confusion in radicalization research. Richards explains 
radicalization is a derivative of “radical” and the term radical historically does not always 
have negative connotations.  Richards subsequently questions who then becomes 
43 Taşpınar, “Fighting Radicalism,” 77. 
44 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, “Radicalisation,” 4. 
45 Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 6. 
46 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 9–10. 
47 Ibid., 8. 
48 Ibid. 
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radicalized?  Should counter terrorism officials only be concerned about those who 
engage in violent actions, or should we be concerned about those who support violent 
extremism.49  If answered, these questions can drastically alter radicalization research 
and the direction taken in future research.  
Additionally, the authors of Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: 
The Persistence of a Failed Discourse describe that the push to understand terrorism has 
created a need for an “easy to understand” narrative for explaining how an individual 
becomes radicalized.50 The authors contend that this easy to understand approach has 
ultimately set us behind in true radicalization research. Radicalization is not a one size 
fits all approach and in order to truly understand it, many areas need to be examined. 
Currently, several schools of thought exist, all offering differing opinions on the 
contributing factors of radicalization.  These schools of thought include, but are not 
limited to: psychology, sociology and social psychology. 
B. DISCIPLINES AND THEORIES OF RADICALIZATION 
1. Introduction 
Terrorism is a complex multi-dimensional process.  As such, the research on the 
radicalization process should also be multi-dimensional.  Radicalization research should 
not simply encompass one specific theory or discipline.51 Radicalization should be 
viewed as a dynamic process that encompasses both individual and situational factors. 
This view, including psychological and social psychological factors, will account for 
individual aspects but will also consider the context and environment in which an 
individual operates in.52  In the section below, I will discuss traditional psychological and 
sociological views on radicalization, ultimately explaining that a social-psychological 
view of radicalization will be the most appropriate view of radicalization in which to  
 
49 Richards, “The Problem with ‘Radicalization,” 144. 
50Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: 
The Persistence of a Failed Discourse,” International Affairs 86, no. 4 (2010): 889–901. 
51 Canter, The Faces of Terrorism, 1. 
52 Volintiru, “Towards a Dynamic Model,” 7. 
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conduct research on isolation. This is not an attempt to discount previous research, rather 
to show the value of building off of prior research and conducting research through an 
inter-disciplinary approach.53 
2. Psychology 
As defined by the American Psychological Association, psychology is the study 
of the mind and behavior.54 Early psychological explanations of radicalization tended to 
focus on the individual.55 Traditionally, psychologists have researched whether mental 
health issues are a contributing factor to radicalization.  Ordinary people have a need to 
understand how individuals can commit such horrendous acts of terrorism and often 
suggest that there is something pathologically different about terrorists: something that 
sets them apart from everyone else. This line of thinking prompted radicalization research 
to determine if there is a unique terrorist profile based off of individual abnormalities.56 
However, as psychologist Bruce Bongar asserts, interviews with terrorists rarely 
concluded that terrorists suffer from any disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders.57  
Additionally, attempts to profile terrorists have failed.58 Psychologist John 
Horgan argues that by trying to create a static terrorist profile we neglect the dynamics 
that shape and develop terrorists.59 Instead of attempting to develop a profile, Horgan 
assesses we should develop a list of “predisposing risk factors” and we should view 
initial involvement in terrorism as a process, which will account for both individual and  
 
 
53 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
54 American Psychological Association, “American Psychological Association,” accessed August 20, 
2013, http://www.apa.org/support/about/apa/psychology.aspx#answer. 
55 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 14. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Bruce Bongar et al., Psychology of Terrorism (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
14.  
58 Horgan, From Profiles to Pathways,” 80. 
59 Ibid., 84. 
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situational determinants. By applying social context to the psychological thought 
processes, research has shown we can more fully account for contributing factors to 
radicalization.  
3. Sociology 
Sociology is the scientific study of society, including patterns of social 
relationships, social interaction, and culture.60  In turn, sociologists have explored aspects 
of economics—most notably poverty and education.  Do areas of poverty and low 
economic status produce terrorists?  This a polarized debate within the field of 
radicalization research. Some researchers argue that the struggle against terrorism should 
focus on social and economic development as the root causes of terrorism.61 Whereas, a 
2003 study, using U.S. State Department data on known terrorist attacks, found no 
evidence suggesting poverty generates terrorism. The researchers Krueger and Laitin 
concluded that poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries.62  
While this research suggests that material conditions do not affect radicalization, one 
important issue to consider is relative deprivation theory (RDT).  Relative deprivation 
theory, and other similar theories such as just-world theory and equity theory, are 
concerned with justice and how interpretations of justice and feelings of deprivation then 
shape thoughts, feelings, and actions.  RDT suggests that it is subjective poverty, rather 
than actual economic status or worth, which influences an individual’s feelings and 
subsequent actions.63   
Additionally, researchers have also explored the aspect of educational 
opportunities, or the lack thereof, as a contributing factor to radicalization. Research has 
suggested this is not a useful explanation of terrorism.64 Mohammed Atta, known as the 
ringleader of the 19 hijackers responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the 
60 American Sociological Association, “American Sociological Association,” accessed August 20, 
2013, http://www.asanet.org/introtosociology/documents/Field%20of%20sociology033108.htm. 
61 Taşpınar, “Fighting Radicalism,” 75. 
62 Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” 50. 
63 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 107. 
64 Bongar et al., Psychology of Terrorism, 17. 
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World Trade Center, came from a middle class family and studied architecture in Cairo, 
Egypt.  Additionally, a 2002 study by Krueger and Maleckova found that in the West 
Bank and Gaza, Palestinians with more years of education tended to support armed 
attacks against Israeli targets more than Palestinians with fewer years of education.65  
That is not to say that for some individuals, economic opportunity and educational 
opportunity does not play a role in their radicalization. This may be related to grievances 
and perceptions of injustice, which would not strictly encompass a sociological school of 
thought, but rather a social psychological standpoint. However, as a whole, using these 
sociological concepts as a basis of radicalization is problematic, as they do not fully 
account for an individual’s path into radicalization. The concept of subjective experience 
and perceived grievances and injustices will play an important role as the discussion of 
radicalization continues. 
4. Social Psychology 
Social psychology has emerged as a leading concept in the study of radicalization. 
Author Randy Borum defines social psychology as “a sub-discipline of psychology 
concerned primarily with relationships, influences, and transactions among people, and 
particularly group behavior.”66 By using a social psychological standpoint, researchers 
can apply social context to psychological schools of thought.  This blended school of 
thought examines internal and external determinants; more accurately encompassing the 
contributing factors of radicalization. Author David Canter assesses, the psychological 
and social psychological processes have been under-represented in the terrorist 
literature.67   
Researchers such a psychologist Phillip Zimbardo demonstrate that it is both 
individual and situational determinants that can drive seemingly normal individuals to 
65 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 162. 
66 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 20. 
67 Canter, The Faces of Terrorism, 1. 
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commit acts of violence.68  This type of research can be applicable when evaluating how 
individuals arrive at the point of committing acts of terror.  Because individuals all 
radicalize in different ways and at different points, it is important to encompass both 
individual and external components.  Additionally, contributions from research on social 
identity theory offer the perspective of how membership in a group influences an 
individual’s behavior. The field of social psychology has emerged as an all-encompassing 
way of viewing radicalization. Subsequently, it is necessary to first address the 
disciplines and theories of radicalization so that we can understand different 
radicalization frameworks used to describe an individual’s progression into 
radicalization.   
C. RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORKS 
The lack of clarity on the theories and disciplines involved in radicalization, have 
subsequently caused problems in adequately addressing the problem.  This lack of clarity 
has hampered the ability to utilize one standard framework for radicalization. Currently, a 
uniform model of radicalization does not exist.  For the purposes of this strategy, a 
radicalization model is defined as a framework outlining the path an individual travels 
throughout the radicalization process, or a framework outlining the causal factors that 
contribute to an individual’s radicalization. Various models of radicalization exist, 
however, members of state, local and federal law enforcement agencies all utilize 
different models consisting of varying theories and processes. Moreover, academics and 
law enforcement agencies all have different ways in which they view radicalization and 
the path an individual travels into radicalization and potentially into committing a 
terrorist act.  With the myriad of thoughts on radicalization it is important to get away 
from a “one size fits all” mentality.69  
Radicalization researchers use several approaches and sets of terminology to 
explain the relationship between individual and environmental influences.  One set of 
68 Philip G. Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding how 
Good People are Transformed into Perpetrators,” in The Social Psychology of Good and Evil, ed. A. Miller 
(New York: Guilford, 2004).  
69Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 8.  
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terminology is the top down / bottom up approach.  The top-down approach assesses the 
roots of terrorism lie in political, social, economic or even evolutionary circumstances. 
On the contrary, the bottom-up approach explores the characteristics of individuals and 
groups.70 Additional researchers designate macro and micro levels in order to make a 
distinction between internal and external variables. Macro levels of radicalization 
encompass societal/cultural influences, whereas micro incorporate individual 
influences.71  When looking at the study of radicalization, it is important to encompass 
both macro and micro levels to provide a comprehensive account of the influences 
affecting an individual’s propensity to become radicalized. Veldhuis and Staun explain 
that one cannot only account for macro-level context. Rather, we must examine 
radicalization as a combination of macro and micro level factors influencing an 
individual’s behavior.  Without using a blended approach of macro and micro and the 
interdependencies present between an individual and their environment, we cannot begin 
to explain why some individuals radicalize and others do not.72 
Table 1 represents the theories and disciplines of radicalization and have been 








70 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 11. 
71 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 8. 
72 Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 19–20. 
73 Karen D. Keys-Turner, “The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process: A Framework for 
Understanding” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 18. 
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Level Discipline  Trajectory Description 




    






    




Table 1.   Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Theories and Processes 
When reviewing the radicalization process, it is also important to make a 
distinction between individual radicalization versus collective radicalization. It is not 
only important to understand individual versus societal influences that affect an 
individual’s path to radicalization but to also understand the motivations of collective 
groups of individuals who radicalize.  Individuals may radicalize on their own such as a 
“lone wolf.” However, in some instances, radicalization is a collective phenomenon and 
can involve large scale shifts in attitude or implicit support or empathy for terrorist 
ideologies.  According to Taşpınar, “Radicalized societies are permeated by a deep sense 
of collective frustration, humiliation and deprivation relative to expectations.”74 The 
motivations for an individual to radicalize can be different than that of the radicalization 
of collective groups.  Not making a distinction between the two can drastically alter the 
outcome of radicalization research.  
D. REVIEW OF CURRENT RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORKS 
This section will review several models of radicalization.  It is necessary to 
review these models because, as explained in the previous section, multiple frameworks 
in which to view radicalization exist.  A review of these models will offer insight into 
exploring a framework that most adequately addresses all of the variables of 
74 Taşpınar, “Fighting Radicalism,” 77. 
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radicalization. This review does not, nor attempt to, encompass all of the variations of 
radicalization models. Rather, this review will focus on radicalization models with 
promising framework or concepts for researchers to utilize.  
1. Staircase to Terrorism 
Fathali Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism” provides a five phase process that 
an individual travels through, with the fifth and final stage leading to a terrorist act.  His 
model incorporates a psychological approach to understanding radicalization and 
terrorism by using a metaphor of narrowing staircase leading to a final act of terrorism.75 
The staircase to terrorism suggests we all begin life on the ground floor of the staircase.  
The staircase leads to higher floors and individuals move to higher floors dependent on 
the doors he or she feels are open to them.  This phase model is a useful explanation of 
radicalization because it takes into account the subjective perception of individuals and 
their situations. On the lower floors, individuals experience perceived injustices and 
relative deprivation. Important, too, is their perception of their ability to rectify these 
injustices through legitimate means. If they feel they cannot, they move higher in the 
staircase and commitment to a terrorist organization may occur. They begin to view 
terrorism as morally acceptable in order to achieve their goal. As progression to higher 
floors occurs, recruitment into a terrorist organization occurs. The fifth and final floor is 
the terrorist act itself wherein individuals have become so committed to the cause they 
are willing to sacrifice themselves or others. It is important to note the staircase metaphor 
allows for individuals to remain at any given floor without moving higher; many people 
will radicalize without ever participating in terrorist behavior.76    
This theory helps explain why some individuals with seemingly similar 
backgrounds elevate to the level of terrorism and other individuals do not. Moghaddam’s 
model specifically accounts for both individual and societal influences. This 
radicalization model is considered a phase model. Phase models show a chronological 
75 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” 161. 
76 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 173. 
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definition of the stages individuals allegedly go through in the radicalization process.77 
Phase models offer a linear approach to radicalization—individuals move from one phase 
to another. This approach allows policy makers the opportunity to make phase specific 
counter actions in order to deter, prevent, or mitigate radicalization within a specific 
phase.78 The use of such phase models has had an impact in radicalization research. For 
example, Moghaddam’s staircase to terrorism model has been adopted by several 
European Union radicalization prevention and intervention projects such as Terrorism 
and Radicalisation (TerRa) and Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators & Responses to 
Radicalisation (SAFIRE).  
2. European Union’s Strategy 
An additional useful model of radicalization is one developed by the European 
Union.  In 2008, the European Commission financed a study through the research project 
Transnational Security, Terrorism, and the Rule of Law, to research who becomes 
radicalized and why.79  The model indicates that radicalization consists of three dynamics 
or causal factors that influence radicalization: external, social, and individual.80  It 
proposes that radicalization cannot be understood through single explanations and 
attempts to provide insight into the causal factors of radicalization.81  The article views 
radicalization as a collective phenomenon, or a process of socialization, which stems 
from individual’s behavior. The authors highlight this through their categorization of 
radicalization into external levels, social levels, and individual levels.82  These levels 
encompass all of the differing factors and views on radicalization provided by 
psychologists, sociologists, homeland security officials, etc.   
77 Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation, 2. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, “Radicalisation,” 5. 
80Ibid., 10. 
81 Ibid., 9. 
82 Ibid., 10. 
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3. John Horgan “Process Model” 
John Horgan, in his work The Psychology of Terrorism, uses what he defines as a 
process model. Horgan developed this concept in order to move terrorism away from a 
complex issue and utilize a model that will clearly account for identifiable behaviors and 
their antecedents, expected consequences, and outcomes. The process model uses three 
distinct phases: involvement, engagement, and disengagement.83 In a separate work, 
Horgan assesses that a critical implication of these distinctions is the recognition that 
each of them may contain unique, or phase-specific, implications for counterterrorism.84  
E. METHODOLOGY 
Because a common radicalization framework does not exist, it has led to 
divergent understandings of radicalization.85 Currently, there are numerous models used 
to describe the radicalization process in an attempt to understand the root causes of an 
individual’s radicalization. In order to effectively conduct the research on isolation and 
radicalization, an easy to understand framework for terrorism was applied.  This thesis 
will use the terminology of John Horgan and categorize radicalization into the three 
phases: initial involvement, engagement, disengagement.  Radicalization is a complex 
issue and in order to determine where isolation plays a role in the radicalization process, 
Horgan’s model offers an easy to understand categorization it into one of three phases.  
This research incorporates aspects of all of the models listed above, and others not 
specifically addressed above. The myriad of radicalization research offers many 
perspective and contributing factors of radicalization.  Elements of each model were 
taken into consideration when evaluating whether or not isolation played a role in 
radicalization. For example, Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism” offers insightful 
views on the mechanisms that affect terrorism. The staircase to terrorism specifically 
addresses variables applicable to the research on isolation. These variables include 
perceived grievances/injustices, personal mobility, social identity theory and charismatic 
83 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 69. 
84 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways,” 80. 
85 Keys-Turner, “The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process,” 12. 
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leaders.86  Additionally, models such as the European Union’s (EU) counter 
radicalization strategy highlight the importance of examining variables from internal, 
external, and societal levels.87  For the sake of this thesis, the terminology of John 
Horgan will be used in the evaluation of which phase isolation played a role.88 It is 
important to note these stages (initial involvement and initial engagement) represent 
differing sets of factors that exert influence over an individual’s movement through the 
radicalization process.89  Additionally, it is important to take all of these factors into 
consideration when attempting to show the role that isolation plays in the radicalization 
process. 
The primary methodology of this thesis will include case studies of three 
radicalized individuals in an attempt to determine if each individual experienced a stage 
of isolation that contributed to their movement throughout the radicalization process. 
Each case study will chronologically describe the individual’s life, including childhood 
upbringing, young adult life, psychological factors, and, finally, a description of the 
attack perpetrated by the individual. Each case study will then be evaluated for what type 
of isolation, if any, the subject experienced. This research is correlational research, and it 
does not attempt to prove cause and effect but rather show the relationship between two 
variables (isolation and radicalization).  The goal of this thesis is to, first, look at all of 
the phases of radicalization that isolation plays a role in and, second, potentially provide 
an opportunity for intervention or prevention.  Case studies will be conducted on three 
individuals who at one time were involved and then fully engaged in the radicalization 
process.  These case studies will be utilized to determine the role that isolation 
(emotional, social or perceived isolation) played throughout the radicalization process.     
Timothy McVeigh, a notorious right-wing domestic terrorist and responsible for 
the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, was selected due to the significant amount of data 
available on his lifestyle and behaviors, and the significant periods of social and 
86 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 161–169. 
87 Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, “Radicalisation,” 10. 
88 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways,” 80. 
89 Ibid., 85. 
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emotional isolation it is believed McVeigh experienced leading up to the attack.  Anders 
Breivik, responsible for the 2011 massacre in Oslo, Norway, was studied as a significant 
amount of information is available through his self-published manifesto.90  Finally, Omar 
Hammami, believed to have participated in several overseas terrorist attacks, was 
selected because of the substantial amount of personal reflections Hammani posted online 
throughout his time fighting with al-Shabaab.  Between the three individuals, there is a 
significant amount of variation including the stages at which each individual moved 
throughout the radicalization process and whether or not each subject is considered a lone 
wolf or an Islamic versus non-Islamic extremist. The case studies utilized previously 
conducted interviews of the subjects and self-accounts of each individual to determine 
whether or not isolation played a role in their individual process of radicalization.   
A standard list of questions was applied to each case study to determine the extent 
to which the subjects were isolated, as well as the nature of the isolation experienced.  
The questions include: 
• Did the subject experience any type of isolation? 
• Did that isolation contribute to the radicalization process? 
• At what stage did isolation play a role? 
• What type of isolation was present (social, emotional, or perceived 
isolation)? 
• What external factors contributed to an individual’s isolation or perceived 
feelings of isolation? 
• Did isolation either introduce or keep an individual involved in the 
radicalization process? 
The following chapter will provide specific detail on the concept of isolation; 
specifically addressing the historical use of isolation in military interrogation, gangs, and 
cults. A detailed explanation on the varieties of isolation, including emotional, social, and 
perceived isolation, will also be provided.  The varieties of isolation will be examined to 
explain the cause of isolation and the known effects of isolation on behavior.  
 
90 Raffaello Pantucci, “What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik?” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 5–6 (2011): 27. 
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III. VARIETIES OF ISOLATION 
An extensive amount of research has been conducted on the topic of isolation. 
However, the majority of these studies evaluate the effects that isolation has on personal 
health (i.e., depression, feelings of loneliness, or coping mechanisms).  Very little 
research has been conducted regarding the role that isolation plays in the radicalization 
process. A review of isolation and how it has been used in historical connotations will 
help us understand the many elements of isolation. The study of isolation has numerous 
implications in the study of radicalization. Isolation can affect anyone—male, female, 
young, old—how does this change the way we view terrorists? Through the study of 
isolation, we can potentially highlight a contributing factor of radicalization that 
seemingly has been unexplored in depth.   
In order to understand the role that isolation plays in the radicalization process, 
we must first examine the different variations of isolation. This thesis will specifically 
focus on three types of isolation: social, emotional, and perceived isolation. The 
following chapter will explore the three types of isolation in depth and review the prior 
research that has been conducted in these areas and the implications these concepts can 
have on the radicalization process. Additionally, it will explore several other concepts 
regarding isolation; specifically, the historical use of isolation as a form of social control 
or punishment, and the innate need of individuals to belong.   
A. SOCIAL ISOLATION 
Social isolation is defined as the deprivation of social connectedness or an 
objective measure of contacts with other people.91 Social isolation, sometimes referred to 
as physical isolation, has been widely studied.  These studies include the effects of social 
isolation on personal health, the elderly, widows, and individuals that live in urban areas 
versus rural areas. By examining the effects that isolation played on the areas referenced 
above, we will further understand how isolation affects people on a behavioral level.  
91 Havens et al., “Social Isolation,” 130. 
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Through the understanding of these outcomes and effects, we can further understand how 
isolation plays a role in the radicalization process.   
A 2009 study on social disconnectedness and perceived isolation explained that 
individuals affected by social isolation, or frequent feelings of loneliness, suffer higher 
rates of mortality, infection, depression, and cognitive decline.92 The study continued to 
explain, socially connected individuals may receive vital support from network members, 
which may, in turn, assist in active coping mechanisms and ultimately reduce stress. The 
authors conclude that individuals who seldom experience isolation have more active 
coping strategies and greater self-esteem and sense of control.93  
Social isolation has also been related to poorer life meaning, lower levels of 
satisfaction, wellbeing, and community involvement. It is suggested that maintaining 
social ties provides one with increased feelings of self-identity and personal control. 
Indicating that inclusion in social networks provides meaning and purpose to one’s life, 
thus leading to reduced levels of psychological distress.94 In addition, there are 
associations between social isolation and mental illness, distress, dementia, premature 
death,95 and suicide.96  
Social isolation has several important implications for radicalization; specifically, 
social isolation impacts an individual’s need to belong to a group and an individual’s 
identity.  Brannan and Strindberg explain, “Belonging to a group is a powerful 
determinant of the identities of most individuals.”97 Social identity theory can help 
explain the relationship between and individual and their membership in groups.98 For 
instance, if individuals no longer fit in their in-group, they then become the out-group and 
92 Cornwell and Waite, “Social Disconnectedness,” 31. 
93 Ibid.,31–34. 
94 Jennifer C. Cornman et al., “Social Ties and Perceived Support Two Dimensions of Social 
Relationships and Health among the Elderly in Taiwan,” Journal of Aging and Health 15, no. 4 (2003): 
620–621. 
95 Hawthorne, “Measuring Social Isolation,” 521–522. 
96 Thomas E. Joiner Jr., Jessica S. Brown and LaRicka R. Wingate, “The Psychology and 
Neurobiology of Suicidal Behavior,” Annual Review of Psychology 56 (2005): 302. 
97 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis, 32. 
98Ibid. 
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can become isolated.  An example may be Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh, 
who desired to be in the Army’s Special Forces. McVeigh tried but ultimately washed out 
of the program and was subsequently isolated from his perceived in-group. 
Conformity studies, such of that of Solomon Asch99 and Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann,100 may also offer insight into the relationship of isolation and radicalization.  
Their studies on conformity explain that people have a desire for conformity and feel 
pressure to conform. Noelle-Neumann explains, “As social beings, most people are afraid 
of becoming isolated from their environment. They would like to be popular and 
respected.”101 Does this need for conformity influence an individual’s decision to belong 
to a group? If so, to what group do they then chose to belong? 
In an additional study conducted on adolescent development, Elliot and Menard 
found that the majority of adolescents, originally identified as peer-isolates, do not 
maintain that status over time. Instead, most of these individuals transition from isolation 
and become members of a larger group.102 These findings pose significant implications 
in the study of isolation and behavior.  What groups do these previous isolates find 
themselves joining?  Additionally, this reinforces the idea that individuals have a need to 
belong to a larger group and a need to remove themselves from their previously isolated 
state. Belonging to a group can satisfy physical isolation, but social isolation also has 
effects on an individual’s state of emotional and perceived isolation. The varieties of 
isolation offer a considerable amount of overlap between the three areas, and it is 
important to distinguish between them in order to understand the unique influences that 
each type of isolation exerts over an individual. 
99 Solomon E. Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” in Reading about the Social Animal, ed. Elliot 
Aronson (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1955), 17–26. 
100 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “Turbulences in the Climate of Opinion: Methodological Applications 
of the Spiral of Silence Theory,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 41, no. 2 (1977): 143–158. 
101 Ibid., 144. 
102 Derek A. Kreager, “Strangers in the Halls: Isolation and Delinquency in School Networks,” Social 
Forces 83 (2004): 352–353. 
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B. EMOTIONAL ISOLATION 
Emotional isolation is represented by the subjective degree an individual feels 
emotionally connected with others.  Emotional isolation may also represent “a gap 
between one’s ideal level of social relationships and their actual level of social 
relationships.”103 An emotionally isolated individual may feel distanced and maintain a 
difficulty relating to others. Emotional isolation is at times characterized with the absence 
or loss of an attachment figure, such as the relationship that parents provide to children or 
the relationships that spouses provide each other.  Weiss suggests that emotional isolation 
can only be substituted by an additional intimate bond.104  A study on the importance of 
emotional isolation suggests that yearning for the loss of an attachment figure, distress, 
and depression are associated with emotional isolation.105  The study focuses on the 
importance of marital status, the loss of a child, and the loss of a confidant. The loss of a 
confidant has also been associated with life satisfaction and morale.106 
C. PERCEIVED ISOLATION 
Finally, perceived isolation is a subjective sense of the lack of social support 
relating to the extent one feels isolated.107 Perceived isolation is based on the subjective 
experiences of the individual. Perceived support can be viewed in both the satisfaction 
with support provided and the degree to which one feels they will be supported in the 
future if needed. Perceived support is indicative of worse psychological distress and 
higher levels of depression.108 Positive perceptions about one’s support network can also 
act as a barrier of stress. Cornwell and Waite state, “For some individuals, the actual  
 
 
103 Stack, “Marriage, Family and Loneliness,” 416. 
104 Van Baarsen et al., “Lonely but Not Alone, “119–135. 
105 Elizabeth Dugan and Vira R. Kivett, “The Importance of Emotional and Social Isolation to 
Loneliness among Very Old Rural Adults,” The Gerontologist 34, no. 3 (1994): 340. 
106 Ibid., 340–341. 
107 Cornwell and Waite, “Social Disconnectedness,” 32. 
108 Cornman et al., “Social Ties and Perceived Support,” 622–623 
 32 
                                                 
amount of social resources available to them is unrelated to the amount of time spent 
alone.”109 The concept of perceived isolation highlights how an individual’s perception 
can influence their well-being and behavior.  
A study on experimental existential psychology, conducted in 2006, focused on 
the five major existential concerns of individuals: death, isolation, identity, freedom, and 
meaning.110 This study investigated the role that these existential concerns play in 
psychological functioning. The study concludes that isolation is an existential concern 
and serves as a reminder that each individual is essentially alone and separate from 
others.  The author explains that even when friends and family are physically present, an 
individual’s subjective experience can still leave them feeling isolated.  The inability to 
truly share one’s experiences with others is consistent with both emotional and perceived 
isolation.  The desire for shared subjective experiences thus leads people to feel a deep 
existential connection with others who appear to share their subjective experiences.111 If 
isolation is viewed as an existential concern, this can lead individuals to seek out those 
who share the same feelings as the individual.  Does this existential concern compel 
individuals to relate to others and join groups or make connections with other like-
minded individuals?   
D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ISOLATION 
As we review isolation, there are several important factors to consider. One 
important distinction to make when researching isolation is to determine whether the 
isolation was self-imposed or forced upon an individual.  Social isolation and loneliness 
are often correlated.  However, those that are socially isolated are not necessarily lonely. 
Social isolation can be one of personal choice and therefore may not have the negative 
effects that are often associated with conditions of loneliness.112 For example, in the 
tradition of writers such as Henry Thoreau, sometimes people seek isolation as a means 
109 Cornwell and Waite, “Social Disconnectedness, 33. 
110 Koole, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, “Introducing Science,” 212. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Havens et al., “Social Isolation,” 130. 
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of personal reflection. But forced isolation is very different and has negative 
consequences. Subsequently, research on preventing school violence suggests that both 
forced isolation and peer rejection have adverse effects on individuals. However, not 
belonging to a group does not have the same detrimental effects on an individual that 
peer rejection does.113  
Subsequently, it is important to note that isolation does not always have a 
negative connotation.  A 2010 article in Psychology Today assesses that social isolation 
in the form of retreat, can be a time of healing, reassessment, and regrouping.114 If social 
isolation is utilized in an effective manner, it can be a useful and necessary component in 
self-evolution.115  As the following chapters examine the role isolation played in an 
individual’s radicalization, this was an essential aspect that was considered. Has an 
individual experienced some type of isolation (social, emotional, perceived)? If so, was 
this isolation self-imposed or was it forced? Did it have positive or negative 
connotations? The distinction between self-imposed versus forced isolation and positive 
versus negative isolation, can drastically alter the outcome of the research when 
determining if isolation plays a role in the radicalization process.  
E. HISTORICAL USES OF ISOLATION AND ITS EFFECTS 
In the past, isolation has been used by several entities and organizations for a 
myriad of reasons.  The following will review the use of isolation by these entities and 
the results that imposed isolation had on individuals.  The use of isolation is often a form 
of social control, punishment, or compliance.  By evaluating the use of isolation and its 
effects, we will have a better understanding of it. This review of the uses of isolation by 
other organizations will offer further insight into the possible use of imposed isolation by  
 
 
113 Karen F. Osterman, “Preventing School Violence,” Phi Delta Kappan 84, no. 8 (2003): 622. 
114 Michael J. Formica, “Psychological and Spiritual Benefit of Interior Retreat,” Psychology Today, 




                                                 
terrorist organizations. Additionally, by studying isolation that was forced upon an 
individual, we can better understand how social isolation can then translate into 
emotional and perceived isolation.  
1. Isolation as Social Control 
Throughout history, cults have used isolation as a form of social control over their 
members. Numerous cults have exerted forms of social and emotional isolation over their 
members for numerous reasons; specifically, it is used as a tactic to recruit and retain 
membership within the cult.  Social isolation also affects the individual’s social networks 
and the support offered by these networks. Through this social isolation, it may in fact 
additionally impose emotional and perceived isolation.  Cult leaders used isolation to 
ensure continued membership within the group and also continued belief in the cause by 
removing external influences.  The isolation ensures the individuals no longer have a 
source of outside perspective, and will only know perspectives that were offered to them 
by the cult leader.  This section will briefly review how isolation was used as a form of 
social control in the Rajneeshpuram Commune in the 1980s and the infamous Jonestown 
community. 
Members of the Rajneeshpuram Commune, located in central Oregon in the 
1980s, were disciples of the Indian religious leader Shree Rajneesh. The Rajneeshpuram 
Commune is an example of how the social isolation of its disciples affected them.  The 
commune was completely isolated from the outside world and was situated on 60,000+ 
acres of land.116  A 1991 study conducted on the Rajneeshpuran Commune indicated that 
individuals living on the compound suffered from both physical and psychological 
isolation.117  Residents were cut off from the outside world, and the only perspective they 
were provided was filtered and negative.  A stark reminder of the impact and control that 
isolation can have over individuals was provided by a female farm worker on the 
Rajneesphuran Commune. She described “if one saw someone writing a lot of letters, 
116 Carl Latkin, “From Device to Vice: Social Control and Intergroup Conflict at Rajneeshpuram,” 
Sociology of Religion 52, no. 4 (1991): 364. 
117 Ibid., 372. 
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something was wrong with that individual. It indicated that his or her energy was no 
longer focused on the ranch.”118 This form of social isolation additionally affected how 
the individuals perceived isolation and their emotional isolation. 
Similarly, “The People’s Temple,” led by notorious Jim Jones utilized isolation as 
a form of social control.  Jones moved the People’s Temple to from San Francisco to 
Guyana in 1977.  Jonestown was five miles away from the nearest settlement, with the 
only way out in or out by plane or boat.119 Leaving was difficult and no one was allowed 
contact with the outside world without permission. Outsiders were not welcome either. 
By moving Jonestown to Guyana, Jones was afforded the opportunity to isolate his 
members without the “contaminating” influence of the outside society; furthermore, his 
followers would not be distracted by the pull of social involvements outside of the 
group.120 The use of physical isolation allowed Jones to maintain control over his people 
and filter the information his members received from the outside world.  Not only did this 
isolation physically isolate his members, but there were indications of emotional and 
perceived isolation as well.  There were accounts from former members of Jonestown 
indicating techniques were used to break down normal family ties, including rewarding 
children for “telling” on their parents or the use of forced abstinence in married 
couples.121  These techniques created distance and a sense of distrust between family 
members in an attempt to solidify individual’s reliance on Jones. 
2. Isolation as Compliancy 
Isolation has also been used as a mechanism to elicit compliancy from an 
individual. Many military, police, and intelligence agencies use isolation as part of their 
interrogation techniques. By reviewing the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
declassified Counterintelligence Manual we can review the effects of imposed 
118 Ibid. 
119 James T. Richardson, “People’s Temple and Jonestown: A Corrective Comparison and Critique,” 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 19, no. 3 (1980): 245–246. 
120 Johnson, “Dilemmas of Charismatic Leadership,” 320 
121 Richardson, “People’s Temple and Jonestown,” 247 
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isolation.122 In 1997, the KUBARK manual was declassified and outlines interrogation 
techniques utilized by the CIA during the Cold War era, many of which are used to day in 
the Global War on Terrorism.123 In the context of interrogation, isolation is two-fold. By 
isolating individuals one prevents them from collaborating with other individuals (i.e., to 
establish a back-story). Isolation is also used so that the individual feels the discomfort of 
being separated and does not benefit from the psychological strength provided by 
socializing with others. The KUBARK manual states, “The symptoms most commonly 
produced by isolation are superstition, intense love of any other living thing, perceiving 
inanimate objects as alive, hallucinations, and delusions.”124 The objective to use 
isolation in interrogation is to leverage the source into a state of compliance in which the 
individual is willing to answer questions; however, subsequent studies conducted by 
Lawrence Hinkle suggest that the adverse effects of isolation (hallucination, delusions, 
fatigue etc.) may reduce the accuracy of the information being provided.125  While the 
use of isolation above is associated with sensory deprivation and is an extreme version of 
isolation, it still shows adverse effects that isolation may have on an individual.   
F. CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the definitions and previous studies on isolation, we have gained 
a better understanding of the concepts.  However, a significant gap still remains on the 
role that isolation plays in the radicalization process.  One challenge when studying the 
effects of isolation is that it is difficult to measure. Social isolation is easier to measure as 
it is characterized as social connectedness—a measurable concept.  However, perceived 
isolation and emotional isolation are both subjective experiences.  In order to conduct 
case studies on individuals, this study relied on the personal experiences of the 
individuals in order to determine if isolation played a role in their radicalization.  
122 KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, 1963, U.S. Crow, 
http://www.uscrow.org/downloads/Survival%20Public%20Domain/Kubark_Counterintelligence_Interrogat
ion_torture_manual1963.pdf, 87–90. 
123 Robert A. Fein, Paul Lehner and Bryan Vossekuil, “Educing Information-Interrogation: Science 
and Art, Foundations for the Future,” Intelligence Science Board Phase 1 Report (Washington, DC: 
National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006), 96. 
124 Ibid., 136–137. 
125 Ibid., 137. 
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Psychologist John Horgan suggests in the study of radicalization, that it might be 
beneficial to establish “predisposing risk factors” for involvement in terrorism.126 Horgan 
indicates “the presence of some emotional vulnerability, in terms of feelings of anger, 
alienation and disenfranchisement” could be used as pre-disposing risk factors.127 
Horgan’s explanation of emotional vulnerability and alienation may encompass all types 
of isolation: social, emotional, and perceived. Furthermore, a 1957 article written by 
Erving Goffman, entitled “Alienation from Interaction,” indicates alienation is not a 
matter of “personality” or “attitude” but rather situational in nature.128 This reiterates the 
importance of viewing isolation and radicalization from the social-psychological 
standpoint and, more specifically, from a situational perspective. Of course, individual 
(dispositional) factors also play a role, but their role has to be interpreted within the larger 
context in which behavior takes place. The following three chapters will include the case 
studies of Timothy McVeigh, Anders Behring Breivik, and Omar Hammami.  By 
viewing the types of isolation (social, emotional, and perceived) as individual entities, we 
can analyze the unique influences each type of isolation exerted over an individual in 




126 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways,” 84. 
127 Ibid., 84–85. 
128 Melvin Seeman, “Alienation Motifs in Contemporary Theorizing: The Hidden Continuity of the 
Classic Themes,” Social Psychology Quarterly (1983): 172. 
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IV. TIMOTHY MCVEIGH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will detail the life of Timothy McVeigh who is responsible for the 
deadly 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building.129 McVeigh was 
26 years old at the time of the attack, and he is an example of an individual who was 
described by many as a “loner” who was subsequently radicalized to the point of 
conducting a terrorist attack.  McVeigh led a secluded life both as a child and throughout 
different stages of his adult life. This chapter will begin by describing his childhood, 
early adult life, his military career, and the turning point in his life – life after the 
military. The different periods of isolation McVeigh experienced will be broken down 
into the previously discussed stages of radicalization— initial involvement and initial 
engagement.   
B. CHILDHOOD 
Timothy James McVeigh was born on Tuesday, April 23, 1968, to father Bill and 
mother Mildred “Mickey” McVeigh.130  The McVeigh family lived a middle class life in 
the towns of Lockport and Pendleton, New York. Timothy was the second born of three 
children; he had an older sister Patricia and a younger sister Jennifer. Mickey kept a 
journal detailing Timothy’s life, and at nine and a half months old, she described him as 
having “quite a temper and is very stubborn, but is almost always happy and smiling.”131 
In addition, Mickey wrote, “At age 1 ½, [Timothy] seems to be getting into a lot of 
trouble. A typical Dennis the Menace.”132 Timothy’s childhood was that of any child, 
learning to ride a bike, playing outside, playing cowboys and Indians or cops and robbers 
with his friends.   
129 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing,” Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-
cases/oklahoma-city-bombing. 
130 Lou Michel, Dan Herbeck, and Gary Telles, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the 
Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Regan Books, 2001), 12. 
131 Ibid., 12. 
132 Ibid., 13. 
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When Timothy was 10, he played on a baseball team coached by his father.  
Timothy was scrawny and was subsequently picked on by a bully. The bully punched 
Timothy, and he fled and wept in the car.133 He felt like a failure to his father, who was 
an accomplished softball player.134 This incident was described by the authors who wrote 
McVeigh’s biography as something that he, McVeigh, would remember forever.135  Over 
time, McVeigh developed a hatred of bullies—of any person, institution or even nation 
that seemed to be picking on the weak.136 
In 1979, Bill and Mickey McVeigh decided to separate.  The parents allowed the 
children to decide who they wanted to live with. The girls wanted to stay together and 
live with Mickey.  Timothy did not want his father to be alone, so he lived with Bill.137  
Timothy claimed it did not bother him much when his mother left. Although Timothy 
claimed his parent’s split did not bother him, he insisted his childhood was no better or 
worse than any other children of divorced parents. Throughout the years, McVeigh would 
lash out repeatedly at the idea of working mothers, blaming them for problems in the 
American society.  At one point, he stated, “In the past thirty years, because of the 
women’s movement, they’ve taken an influence out of the household.”138 Tim never felt 
a love for his parents or siblings. There was only one person Tim could say he loved, his 
paternal grandfather Ed McVeigh.  They shared a love of guns and spent a significant 
amount of time together. When not with his grandfather, McVeigh spent time in solitude 
on his bicycle riding throughout Niagara County, New York.139   
McVeigh had a high IQ, but again, he found himself at the hands of bullies when 
he was in the seventh grade. In junior high, Timothy was attempting to figure out who he 
was and where he fit in.  To that end, he pursued a wide path toward social acceptance, 
133 Ibid., 19. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 20. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Brandon M. Stickney, All-American Monster: The Unauthorized Biography of Timothy McVeigh 
(New York: Prometheus Books, 1996), (Kindle ed.), 643. 
138 Michel, Herbeck and Telles, American Terrorist, 21.  
139 Ibid., 25. 
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bouncing from one group of friends to the next, making many acquaintances, but building 
close connections with only a few.140 As Timothy grew, so did his self-confidence and he 
was able to fend off bullies. McVeigh’s parents’ marriage hit another rocky spot and 
finally split for the third and final time in 1984. Timothy again chose to live with his 
father.  As a teenager, when he was not working, he was holed up in his bedroom and had 
developed a love of computers. McVeigh had a group of hacking friends and was 
recognized by his high school as the “most promising Computer Programmer.”141  In 
1986, Timothy graduated from high school.  
C. EARLY ADULTHOOD 
After graduation, McVeigh was described as to having fallen into a funk.142  But 
this time was later described as a time of personal reflection where McVeigh was 
determining who he was, how he fit into the world, and where he wanted to go with the 
rest of his life. McVeigh then used a scholarship to attend a local two-year business 
college for computer programming, but after a short while he quit attending college 
classes.143 McVeigh still indulged in reading about guns and the Second Amendment. 
This is the point in McVeigh’s life where he was introduced to the Turner Diaries.144 
The Turner Diaries is a fictional book depicting the diaries kept by Ed Turner. Turner, a 
member of a neo-nazi organization, described how patriotic white Americans were 
discriminated against by the Jewish controlled government. The government confiscated 
the weapons of white Americans, encouraged non-white foreign immigration, and 
encouraged affirmative action, which put minorities in positions of power within society 
and the government. The Turner Diaries depicts the plight of the white patriots and their 
140 Ibid., 29. 
141 Ibid., 32. 
142 Ibid., 36. 
143 Ibid., 37. 
144 Ibid., 39. 
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struggle to overthrow the Jewish controlled government through countless acts of 
violence.145 This book would prove to be influential later on in McVeigh’s life.  
Throughout the course of his early life, McVeigh had developed a survivalist 
instinct, and he wanted to be able to defend and protect himself if necessary. In American 
Terrorist, the authors “People have to protect themselves. We can’t just depend on the 
government to protect us.”146 McVeigh began to prepare for the worst by stockpiling 
water, investing in guns, etc. In order to finance his survivalist mentality and love for 
expensive guns, he became an armed security guard. Just shy of his twentieth birthday, he 
became an armored car driver, where he excelled at his job and was respected by his 
employers. After a short while, McVeigh again decided it was time for a change in his 
life.  
D. MILITARY CAREER 
In May 1988, McVeigh decided to join the United State Army. McVeigh scored 
exceptionally high on the Military Vocational Aptitude Test, only missing one question.  
The Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Army recruiters all wanted him. McVeigh decided to 
join the Army because he enjoyed the idea of being an infantryman and honing in on his 
survival skills.147 McVeigh set his sights on either the Special Forces or Army Ranger. 
He attended basic training in Fort Benning, Georgia.148 Although McVeigh never really 
felt like he fit in back in Pendleton, but he felt comfortable in the military. In the 
beginning, McVeigh was assigned to an experimental program called Cohesion, 
Operational Readiness and Training (COHORT); a unit designed to put new soldiers in 
small teams to form bonds and lasting friendships. Being part of the COHORT team was 
a three year commitment and prohibited him for trying out for Special Forces for at least 
three years.  While disappointed, McVeigh made friendships through the COHORT team 
145 Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, “Inside the Turner Diaries: Neo-Nazi Scripture,” Political 
Science and Politics 30, no. 4 (1997): 717–718. 
146 Michel, Herbeck and Telles, American Terrorist, 40. 
147 Ibid., 50. 
148 Stickney, All-American Monster, 848. 
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that would impact the rest of his life, namely Terry Lynn Nichols.149 Nichols was more 
mature and experienced than many others and became the squad leader for the second 
platoon, which included McVeigh. The two men quickly bonded.150 McVeigh thrived in 
the military showing amazing attention to detail and motivation. Authors Michel, 
Herbeck and Telles state, “Timothy McVeigh would come to consider his first two years 
in the military as the finest period of his life.”151 McVeigh’s Fort Benning experience 
came to an end in August 1988, and he had achieved the maximum test score for an 
infantry trainee.  
In September of 1988, McVeigh attended specialized training at Fort Riley, 
Kansas. At Fort Riley, McVeigh joined Company C, 2/16 Infantry Battalion.  Terry 
Nichols joined McVeigh at Fort Riley.152 However, shortly afterwards, Nichols abruptly 
left the Army in 1989 due to family hardships.  In Nichols’ absence, McVeigh forged a 
bond with Michael Fortier, an Army recruit from Arizona.  While most recruits went out 
and partied on their weekends off, McVeigh did not indulge in the bar scene. Many times 
he was alone in the barracks checking equipment and reading manuals.153 Having 
excelled at Fort Riley, McVeigh reenlisted in the army for an additional four years in 
1990. McVeigh finally received the news he had been waiting for, the Army petitioned 
him to try out for Special Forces.  He was to report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 
November of 1990.154 Weeks before trying out for Special Forces, McVeigh was sent to 
war in the Middle East.  
McVeigh’s company prepared for combat duty and was stationed in Saudi Arabia 
in January 1991. They were part Operation Desert Storm, where the Allied forces were 
intent on pushing Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.  During his time in 
Kuwait, McVeigh received the rank of sergeant and later the “Army Commendation 
149 Michel, Herbeck and Telles, American Terrorist, 53–54. 
150 Stickney, All-American Monster, 857. 
151 Michel, Herbeck and Telles, American Terrorist, 56. 
152 Ibid., 58. 
153 Ibid., 61. 
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Medal.” McVeigh subsequently received four other medals during his service in the 
Persian Gulf. His experience in the Gulf brought out many emotions.  It bothered 
McVeigh to be part of a war that involved no direct threat to the US, and he felt deep 
regret for the killing of Iraqi soldiers. Finally, President Bush ordered a cease fire on 
February 28, 1991. In late March of the same year, the Army Special Forces reached out 
to McVeigh, and he was to travel back to the U.S. and report to the Special Forces 
Selection and Assessment Course at Fort Bragg.155 
When McVeigh reported to Camp McCall (the Special Forces Assessment 
Facility at Fort Bragg), it was just what he had been looking for, only one problem—
McVeigh was not ready.156 His time in Desert Storm had broken him down physically 
and emotionally. He was physically out of shape and had endured several months of 
unrelieved stress. Commanders at Camp McCall immediately recognized the difficulty of 
the soldiers who were just returning from Desert Storm.  The commanders offered to 
defer the tryouts and have the individuals come back when they were better prepared. 
However, McVeigh did not seize the opportunity to defer training, which would later 
become a costly mistake. Through the first exercises of the Special Forces Assessment, 
McVeigh realized he was not going to make it through the program. Shortly after 
arriving, McVeigh withdrew from the training program. This was difficult for McVeigh, 
as he had spent his time excelling in the military and now was not going to make it in the 
coveted Special Forces.  The commander offered to have McVeigh try out again at a later 
time, but this never came to fruition.157 
When McVeigh returned to his station at Fort Riley, his demeanor had changed.  
McVeigh still excelled at his duties, especially gunnery.  However, he no longer had his 
gung-ho attitude towards the military. Instead it turned into bitterness, anger, and a desire  
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for isolation.158 McVeigh seemingly began to grow disenchanted with Army life.  
Additionally, he was upset with the lack of cohesion among and lack of commitment to 
excellence of those in his unit, Charlie Company.   
Although questioning his decision to reenlist, McVeigh still excelled at his duties 
and received excellent evaluations from his superiors.  At the end of 1991, after learning 
of an Early Transition Program, McVeigh left the Army altogether; he received an 
honorable discharge.159 McVeigh considered the months he spent in the Army the best 
times of his life.  However, at the end, he looked back on his career, and it was 
overshadowed by disappointments—the lies told in Desert Storm, and, worse, the killing 
of Iraqi soldiers that he had committed on behalf of the American government.  He felt 
the American government was trying to so hard to take away individual liberties and the 
Second Amendment.  He no longer wanted to work for a government he was beginning to 
hate.160  
E. LIFE AFTER THE MILITARY 
After leaving the Army, McVeigh returned to his father’s home in Pendleton, 
New York where he thought the skills he had developed in the Army (leadership, 
marksmanship, etc.) would help him land a job.  That was not the case, and the next 13 
months proved disappointing. He attempted to get jobs doing computer programming but 
eventually settled on a security guard position. To supplement his low income, McVeigh 
joined a National Guard unit only 15 miles from home.  McVeigh found himself back as 
a security guard and back in the military. He felt as if he was moving backwards, not 
forwards.161 He eventually took an armed security position with the same company. 
McVeigh, while living on his father’s couch, tried to get several other jobs including one 
with the United State Marshals Service, but he was never offered the position. While 
working long hours and sleeping on his father’s couch, McVeigh came to the realization 
158 Ibid., 87. 
159 Stickney, All-American Monster, 1235. 
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that he did not fit in in New York anymore.162 One evening McVeigh had an emotional 
breakdown and immediately went to his grandfather’s house, the only place he felt he 
belonged. When he arrived at his grandfather’s house McVeigh was at rock bottom, but 
he eventually moved forward.  In 1992, McVeigh resigned from the Army Reserve unit.  
At the same time, his disdain for the government was building.  He was writing letters to 
newspapers, congressman, and he was reading more and more anti-government material. 
McVeigh believed the federal government was going to disarm the American people and 
take away their right to bear arms.  
In 1992, McVeigh decided he was leaving the state of New York.  McVeigh was 
in a search for a more free state, where taxes were not so high and there was less 
government regulation.163 When the standoff in Waco, Texas occurred and the Branch 
Davidian compound was under siege, McVeigh traveled there.  He was interviewed by a 
student reporter and said, “I believe we are slowly turning into a socialist government.  
The government is continually growing bigger and more powerful, and the people need to 
prepare themselves against government control.”164 After leaving Waco, McVeigh went 
on the road travelling from gun show to gun show, selling books and survival items.  
Over the next months, McVeigh travelled throughout the United States spending 
time in Kingman, Arizona (AZ) with his old Army friend Michael Fortier and time in 
Michigan with Terry Nichols.165 While staying at the Nichols’ farm in Michigan, the 
events of Waco, Texas unfolded with the compound catching fire and the deaths of many 
people. McVeigh viewed the tragedy at Waco as another example of the government 
acting as a bully. A month after the deaths at Waco, McVeigh was back in Kingman with 
Mike Fortier. Here he considered the idea of forming a militia and typed up eight pages  
 
 
162 Ibid., 102. 
163 Ibid., 116. 
164 Ibid., 120. 
165 Ibid., 128. 
 46 
                                                 
of quotes on subjects from gun control to taxation.166 In October 1993, McVeigh wrote a 
letter to his sister Jennifer, he stated he had “an urgent need for someone in the family to 
understand me.”  
In February 1994, McVeigh rented a house in Golden Valley, AZ, only a few 
miles away from Mike Fortier.167 Fortier began noticing changes in McVeigh, and it 
seemed as if McVeigh believed the New World Order was going to attack him 
personally. His home in Golden Valley, looked like a bunker. It was also during this 
period that McVeigh began experimenting with small homemade explosives.  Around the 
same time, McVeigh’s beloved grandfather became ill, so he travelled home to visit his 
grandfather.  This was a tumultuous time in McVeigh’s life, and when he returned back 
to Arizona, he took measures to distance himself from yet another confidant—his 
childhood friend Steve Hodge.168  
F. PLANNING THE ATTACK  
September 1994 proved to be a turning point for McVeigh.  Up till this point, he 
had been travelling throughout the U.S. for gun shows, which afforded him the 
opportunity to discuss his love of guns and survival skills with other like-minded 
individuals.  However, when a new Federal Assault Weapons Ban became law, and 
rumors for additional gun legislation circulated, McVeigh made a decision—he was 
going to commit an act of violence against the government.169 He subsequently spent the 
next several months developing a plan and acquiring supplies in order to conduct his 
attack. McVeigh had decided to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah building on the second 
anniversary Waco, April 19, 1995.170 Throughout the course of his radicalization, 
McVeigh had considered several targets, finally deciding on the Murrah building, which 
166 Ibid., 141. 
167 Ibid., 151. 
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housed 14 different federal agencies, as it comprised a cross section of many federal 
agencies who McVeigh believed had at one point or another mistreated the public.171 
On Sunday October 16, 1994, Ed McVeigh, Timothy’s grandfather passed away.  
McVeigh was already on the road and his family had no way to reach him. McVeigh did 
not find out his grandfather had passed away until two days after he had already been 
buried.  McVeigh went home to help his father handle his grandfather’s estate, and he 
stayed in New York through early December 1994.172 After leaving Pendleton, for 
months McVeigh continued to acquire supplies and make plans in order to coordinate his 
attack. On March 31, 1995, he left the Fortier’s home in Kingman for the last time.  He 
rented a room at a nearby motel and spent the following days alone in his motel room.173 
McVeigh checked out of the motel on April 12, 1995—one week prior to the attack.174 
The next week was spent logistically acquiring the necessary items in order to conduct 
the attack—retrieving the components to make the bomb, acquiring the rental truck, and 
establishing a get-away vehicle.  
G. ISOLATION 
McVeigh’s life was full of ups and downs. He went through periods where he 
excelled and was widely accepted by his peers; though in other instances, he displayed 
the drastic effects that rejection by his peers had on him. The extreme incidents in 
McVeigh’s life demonstrate the effects that isolation has on an individual, both self-
imposed isolation and that which was forced upon him. This highlights the importance of 
perceptions and how McVeigh perceived his relationships with others. In several 
instances throughout his life, McVeigh perceived that he no longer connected with an 
individual, so he took drastic steps to dissolve that relationship. Through the analysis of 
McVeigh’s life, we can see how isolation drastically affected him and his path through 
radicalization, ultimately deciding to conduct a terrorist attack. Significant periods of 
171 Ibid., 168. 
172 Ibid., 171–185. 
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isolation throughout McVeigh’s life can be seen through his radicalization process, both 
in the initial involvement phase and the initial engagement phase.  McVeigh experienced 
all types of isolation: emotional, perceived and social isolation. The following section 
will detail these periods of isolation and the profound affect that it had on McVeigh.  
1. Initial Involvement 
McVeigh’s isolation began early in life as he spent significant periods of time 
alone as child. By the age of 10, his parent’s had separated. While Bill McVeigh worked 
hard to support his family, this left Timothy at home by himself for long periods of time. 
McVeigh spent a significant amount of his childhood raising himself. At one time, 
McVeigh jokingly remarked “They were never there when I came home from school, 
hell, I was one of the original latch-key kids, long before the term became popular.”175 
McVeigh was left socially isolated and spent long hours in solitude in his bedroom or 
outside. These hours of solitude left McVeigh longing for an emotional connection. 
Throughout his childhood, McVeigh also suffered from emotional isolation and 
perceived isolation where he did not feel a connection with his parents. With both of his 
parents working full time jobs, he felt like he never had a parent to talk with when he 
came home from school.176 Tim said he did not ever really feel close with either of his 
parents, “I can’t attribute anything I am now to any lack of my parent’s presence in the 
home.  I don’t know why I go off on that, but I do say that I have very few memories of 
interactions with my parents.”177 McVeigh’s childhood and lack of parents in the home 
shows signs of all three types of isolation; social, emotional, and perceived.   
McVeigh’s encounter with bullies throughout his childhood also continued his 
emotional isolation. Peer rejection has profound effects on children. In the book Secrets 
Worth Dying For, the authors describe that McVeigh had “become more of a loner, 
where he would escape into a world of fantasy and make believe. Like the heroes form 
175 David Paul Hammer and Jeffery William Paul, Secrets Worth Dying for: Timothy James McVeigh 
and the Oklahoma City Bombing, (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2004), 15. 
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his comic books, he would create scenarios of revenge to atone for past moments of 
weakness and to defeat his enemies.”178 This rejection in turn caused McVeigh to 
develop a hatred for bullies—a hatred that would continue throughout his life.  
McVeigh’s time in the military was a confidence booster. It was a place where he 
excelled and felt accepted; however, at times throughout his military career, McVeigh 
isolated himself from his peers. While the majority of his peers spent their downtime 
going out to bars, McVeigh spent a considerable amount of time isolated in his room 
playing video games, and reading equipment manuals.179 McVeigh’s military career also 
showed signs of perceived isolation.  After a successful military career, McVeigh 
abruptly left the Army, citing one of his reasons as the lack of cohesion he felt like the 
Charlie Company had developed.  McVeigh also became disenchanted because he 
dropped out of the Special Forces program.  While this was a personal choice on 
McVeigh’s behalf, Special Forces was what he aspired to be—a team working together 
on important operations. Social identity theory can help explain the relationship between 
an individual and their membership in groups.180 For instance, if individuals no longer fit 
in their in-group, they then become the out-group and can become isolated.  By McVeigh 
washing out of Special Forces, he was subsequently isolated from his perceived in-group. 
He then became even more disenchanted with the lack of cohesion of the Charlie 
Company and ultimately left the Army all together.  
This perception of isolation from the military then pushed McVeigh deeper into 
isolation. People tend to rectify rejection by becoming part of a larger group. After 
ending his military career, McVeigh spent the majority of his time travelling throughout 
the United States attending gun shows. Gun shows were a place where McVeigh felt at 
home. They provided him the opportunity to connect and talk with other like-minded 
people—gun enthusiasts. While the gun shows did allow McVeigh the opportunity to 
connect with others, he spent a considerable amount of time on the road alone.  
Additionally, even in the gun show circuit, McVeigh would experience rejection. Over 
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his years of attending gun shows, McVeigh had forged a friendship with Roger Moore 
and Karen Anderson, a couple from Arkansas. They allowed McVeigh to sell his 
survivalist items at their booth. McVeigh had become increasingly paranoid of 
government control, an incident occurred at one show where McVeigh confronted an 
individual he believed to be a police officer. After the confrontation, McVeigh left the 
booth unattended for a couple hours. When McVeigh returned, he and Moore got into a 
confrontation, and both were asked to leave the gun show. McVeigh viewed Moore’s 
reaction to the incident as one of rejection. He believed Moore was more interested in 
making money than supporting the Patriot Movement.181 McVeigh and his accomplice 
were believed to have significant ties to the antigovernment Patriot Movement, 
participating in citizen militias and common law courts.182  
While McVeigh was trying to fill a void by attending guns shows, it was clear that 
he still felt emotionally isolated. Even after the incident at the gun show, McVeigh 
continued to travel from show to show, and his path towards radicalization evolved. 
McVeigh wrote a letter to his sister Jennifer in October 1993. McVeigh wrote he had “an 
urgent need for someone in the family to understand me.”183 This letter described the 
evening when McVeigh had his breakdown and went to his grandfather’s house almost in 
a state of suicide.  The letter then attempted to explain his “lawless behavior and 
attitude.”184  This is an example of how McVeigh perceived injustices perpetrated upon 
him by the federal government. These perceived injustices by the United States 
government pushed McVeigh to the edge. He also felt as if no one would understand 
him—he once again was isolated as he felt like no one understood him, and no one else 
had the commitment to rectifying these injustices alongside him.  
181 Michel, Herbeck, and Telles, American Terrorist, 144. 
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2. Initial Engagement 
In July of 1994, McVeigh cut off contact with his close confidants. McVeigh 
dissociated himself from his boyhood friend, Steve Hodge, by sending a 23-page farewell 
letter to him. McVeigh felt as if he and Hodge no longer shared the same interests and 
that he and Hodge had hit a “philosophical impasse over McVeigh’s hatred of the federal 
government.”185  In this letter, McVeigh proclaimed his devotion to the United States 
Declaration of Independence. Explaining: 
Those who betray or subvert the Constitution are guilty of sedition and/or 
treason, are domestic enemies and should and will be punished 
accordingly. It also stands to reason that anyone who sympathizes with the 
enemy or gives aid or comfort to said enemy is likewise guilty. I have 
sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign 
and domestic and I will. And I will because not only did I swear to, but I 
believe in what it stands for in every bit of my heart, soul and being. I 
know in my heart that I am right in my struggle, Steve. I have come to 
peace with myself, my God and my cause. Blood will flow in the streets, 
Steve. Good vs. Evil. Free Men vs. Socialist Wannabe Slaves. Pray it is 
not your blood, my friend.186  
This shows McVeigh’s perception of being isolated and not having a support 
network available to him. Because he perceived himself as not relating to anyone, 
McVeigh took the drastic step of self-imposing isolation by cutting contact with those he 
believed no longer understood him.  
At this point, his beloved grandfather, Ed McVeigh passed away—the one person 
who McVeigh felt a bond with. McVeigh was already on a path of radicalization and 
missed his grandfather’s funeral because he was on the road getting ready to conduct an 
attack. At this point, McVeigh was operationally involved in conducting an attack by 
gathering supplies, doing reconnaissance etc. None of his family members had a way of 
making contact with McVeigh. Even after his grandfather’s funeral, McVeigh further 
isolated himself in order to coordinate his attack.  
185 Ibid., 153. 
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Months before the attack, McVeigh socially isolated himself for operational 
reasons. He spent time on road, hopping from place to place. This was evident in a 
subsequent letter he wrote to his sister Jennifer in which he stated, “Of course you must 
realize, then, that I’m not living in Arizona. Why am I running? I am trying to keep my 
path ‘cool,’ so in case someone is looking to ‘shut up someone who knows too much’ I 
will not be easy to find.”187 Additionally, weeks prior to the attack McVeigh rented a 
motel room in Arizona. The authors of American Terrorists write, “He spent the next 
twelve days in lockdown mode—almost completely alone thinking and planning.”188 
This seclusion before the attack may have served two purposes. One, McVeigh was 
operationally hiding out.  However, McVeigh may have used this time as one of personal 
reflection in order to prepare himself for the attack.  
Even in the end, McVeigh was isolated. His friends, Terry Nichols and Mike 
Fortier, who served in the Army with him and who shared the same ideologies as him no 
longer wanted to be part of his larger plot.  Mike Fortier refused to take part in the 
attack.189 Days prior to the attack, Terry Nichols did not show up for a planned meeting 
in order to stash McVeigh’s getaway car. On the day planned to assemble the bomb, 
Nichols was late. While waiting on Nichols to show, McVeigh was determined to carry 
out the attack even if that meant doing it on his own. However, Nichols finally did show, 
and they assembled the bomb together on Tuesday, April 18, 1995. His friends’ lack of 
commitment to the cause infuriated McVeigh and affected the way he perceived himself. 
However, this did not stop McVeigh. On Wednesday April 19, 1995 Timothy McVeigh 
drove to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
H. TERRORIST ACT 
On Wednesday, April 19, 1995, at 9:02 am, Timothy McVeigh detonated a device 
in the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The building housed 14 
187 Ibid., 196–197. 
188 Ibid., 202. 
189 Ibid., 201. 
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different federal agencies and numerous other state government offices.190 The bomb 
consisted of 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate and nitromethane and was placed in the 
back of a Ryder rental truck.  McVeigh lit the five minute fuse, drove the truck to a drop 
off zone, parked the truck, and exited the area on foot. The blast left a U-shaped hole in 
the north side of the building and killed 168 individuals, including 19 children.191  In 
addition, the blast injured approximately 500 others. The attack is the deadliest act of 
homegrown terrorism in the history of the United States.192 
I. CONCLUSION 
Through the examination of McVeigh’s life, it is evident that he experienced 
numerous stints of isolation. Through the ups and downs of McVeigh’s life, one thing 
remained constant——he suffered from significant episodes of social, emotional, and 
perceived isolation.  These occurrences had a considerable impact on the way in which 
McVeigh perceived his life, and the options McVeigh felt he had.  Throughout 
McVeigh’s radicalization there were episodes of both forced isolation and self-imposed 
isolation—each exerting unique influences on the choices he made. In his youth, 
McVeigh was forced into isolation through the rejection of his peers and the lack of his 
parent’s presence. However as an adult, McVeigh preferred seclusion most of the time. 
McVeigh’s inability to make it in the Army’s Special Forces program left him searching 
for a new purpose in life.  McVeigh thought he found it within the gun show circuit and 
the friends he made; however, at times that too led to disappointment.  McVeigh felt as if 
his attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building was a statement that could not be ignored.   
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V. ANDERS BEHRING BREIVIK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will detail the life of Anders Behring Breivik, who was responsible 
for the 2011 attacks in Oslo and Utøya Norway, which left 77 people dead. Breivik, 32 at 
the time of the attack, led a secluded existence throughout different stages of his adult 
life. This chapter will begin by describing his childhood, early adult life, and the turning 
point in his life. The different periods of isolation Breivik experienced will be broken 
down into the previously discussed stages of radicalization—initial involvement and 
initial engagement. 
B. CHILDHOOD 
Anders Behring Breivik was born in February 1979 in Norway to Jens Breivik 
and Wenche Behring, and the three of them spent the first year of Anders’ life living in 
London as his father was a diplomat for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in London. His 
parents divorced when Anders was one year old.  His father and new stepmother 
remained in London for a short period of time but ultimately moved to Paris, France. 
Breivik’s mother, along with Anders and his half-sister Elisabeth, moved back to Oslo, 
Norway.193 The first few years of his life were marked with instability.194  
Breivik’s mother, Wenche, had a difficult time employed as a nurse and raising 
Anders and Elisabeth. When Anders was two years old, Wenche applied for a weekend 
home for her son.  In the application Breivik was described as a demanding child who 
exhausted his mother both physically and psychologically.195 The application was 
approved and Breivik spent several weekends with another family.  In 1983, Anders, 
Wenche, and Elisabeth spent a month in a national center for children and youth 
193 Andrew Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 2011, Federatio of American 
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psychiatry. At this point, Jens Breivik filed for custody of Anders. The custody case was 
presented to the court who ultimately decided for custody to remain with his mother, 
Wenche. A year after the court’s custody decision, Norwegian child welfare filed a letter 
expressing concern with the family conditions, which again lead to an investigation in 
which the authorities considered moving Breivik into foster care.  This was eventually 
deemed as an unnecessary step and the case was closed with custody of Breivik 
remaining with Wenche.196  
Breivik visited his father and stepmother in Paris often as a child.  He also visited 
his father and stepmother at their summer homes in Normandie, France and Notodden, 
Norway until they divorced when he was 12 years old. Until the point, Breivik published 
his compendium in 2011, he still remained in contact with his stepmother Tove 
Overmo.197 Breivik’s stepfather, Tore, was a major in the Norwegian military and 
Breivik described him as a very likable and good guy. In his compendium, Breivik states, 
“all in all, I consider myself privileged and I feel I have had a privileged upbringing with 
responsible and intelligent people around me.”198 In his 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence, he writes, “I haven’t really had any negative experiences in my childhood 
in anyway.  I had way too much freedom though if anything.”199 
Breivik continues by describing his relationship with his four half siblings as 
good, especially with his sister Elisabeth. Growing up, Breivik’s best friend was a 
Muslim. Breivik describes his friend Arsalan as failing to integrate, like many 
Norwegian-Pakistani’s, into the Norweigan community.  According to Breivik, after 
failing to integrate, Arsalan became involved in Pakistani gangs that became involved in 
targeted violence against ethnic Norwegians. After seeing this, Breivik cut off contact  
 
 
196 Ibid., 7. 
197 Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 1386. 
198 Ibid., 1387. 
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with him.200 This mentality and these actions would drastically affect Breivik in his later 
years and the way in which he formed opinions of minorities and the push for 
multiculturalism in Norway. 
C. TEENAGE YEARS 
Breivik’s teenage years were somewhat troubled as well.  Breivik immersed 
himself into a hip-hop community in Oslo. Years after leaving the movement, in his 
compendium, Breivik reflects on the negative aspects of the hip-hop movement.  He 
assesses the hip-hop movement propagates anti-social and antiauthority views: it glorifies 
drug use, it propagates anarchistic attitudes through the graffiti movement, and it glorifies 
violence and gang mentality. In addition, he estimates that he inflicted property damage, 
through “tagging” of approximately 2 million Euro.201 At age 14, he was charged twice 
with graffiti and vandalism.  Later the same year, he was caught with 43 aerosol spray 
cans as he was arriving from Denmark.  His mother did not know he had taken the trip to 
Denmark, which prompted talks between the Breivik family and child welfare. Wenche 
expressed concerns that her son was turning towards a criminal path.202 This is the point 
in Breivik’s life in which his father cut off contact with him.203   
Breivik suggests in his compendium that he noticed all of the individuals in the 
hip-hop movement were “academically weak.” At age 16, Breivik decided to focus more 
on his studies so that he did not end up like them, and he departed from the hip-hop 
movement in Oslo.204 Also at the age of 15, Breivik chose to be baptized and confirmed 
in the Norwegian State Church.  Around the same time, Breivik delayed his military 
service because his mother fell ill and Breivik cared for her. 
At age 16, Breivik began high school. He disliked it and after the first year, so he 
changed schools. He spent one more year in a second school, but he did not like it either 
200 Ibid., 1376–1377. 
201 Ibid., 1206–1209. 
202 Ravndal, “A Pre-Trial Profile,” 7. 
203 Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 1386. 
204 Ibid., 1390. 
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and dropped out for good.205 Although Breivik discontinued his formal education, he 
considered himself very ambitious.  Early on, he had decided to choose economics as his 
main academic direction because he wanted to pursue a career in business or finance. 
Breivik contends he excelled his first year in high school, and the second year he 
completed extra credits towards his third year of schooling.  He explains, “This left me 
with a lot of spare hours during my last year, which was a bit frustrating.  There were no 
high school courses for gifted individuals who wanted to take the courses in two years.” 
Additionally, the Norwegian schooling system did not offer a degree that he wanted (the 
U.S. equivalent of a Bachelor of Business Administration).  This is the point when 
Breivik decided to pursue his higher education informally. 
Additionally, when he was around 16 or 17, Breivik joined the Progress Party 
Youth Organization. The party was regarded as anti-immigration and pro-free market and 
was a “moderate cultural conservative youth movement.”206 This is the time in which 
Breivik decided he wanted to dedicate his life to politics in order to change the system. It 
appealed to Breivik, as it was the only party who opposed multiculturalism. He was 
active in the Progress Party/Progress Party Youth from the age of 16 to 21.  He 
eventually concluded it would be impossible to change the system democratically and left 
conventional politics in hopes to find another way.207 
D. EARLY ADULTHOOD 
Around 2000, Breivik stated he realized the democratic struggle against the 
Islamisation of Europe, European multiculturalism was lost.  He contends that the 
democratic means were fruitless and that in another 50–70 years, that the Europeans 
would be the minority. As soon as Breivik realized this, he decided to explore other 
means of opposition—ultimately armed resistance. He describes his decision in these 
terms, “Protesting is saying that you disagree. Resistance is saying you will put a stop to 
205 Ravndal, “A Pre-Trial Profile,” 7. 
206 Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 1396. 
207 Ibid.,1377–1378. 
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this.  I decided I wanted to join the resistance movement.”208 This proved to be a pivotal 
decision in Breivik’s life; ultimately, altering the path he chose. 
Breivik spent the next few years working on his curriculum consisting of 
economics, finance, sales and marketing.  By composing his own curriculum, this 
allowed him to focus on areas he deemed relevant to his entrepreneurial focus.209  He 
decided not to formalize his education because when he was 21 or 22 years old (2001 or 
2002), he claimed to have joined the Armed European Resistance Movement.  At this 
point, he had made no concluding decisions in reference to conducting an operation or 
not, and he still felt as if he had more to learn. He decided that if he had formalized his 
education, this would only sidetrack his plans for futures operations.  Registering at a 
formal institution, he decided, would be counter-productive for his future intentions. He 
also acknowledged that there would not be any professors who would approve of his 
thesis at a master’s or PhD level. He said that attending a university is all about prestige 
and that he cared very little about prestige and, therefore, had no incentive to formalize 
his education.210 
Throughout this time, Breivik remained close with several of his childhood 
friends.  He states, “I’ve always been good at socializing, getting to know new 
people.”211 Breivik spent many weekends with his friends and maintained close contact 
with them throughout the years.  Although he admits that when he began planning his 
operation, he had to limit the amount of contact he spent with them. Also, when Breivik 
was 22 years old, he tried to re-contact and establish a relationship with his father.212  His 
father was not willing to establish a relationship with Breivik because as the father 
explained, he was not mentally prepared for a reunion due to various reasons. This was 
the last time Breivik attempted to contact his father.213   
208 Ibid., 1378. 
209 Ibid., 1396–1397. 
210 Ibid., 1400. 
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In 2001, Breivik moved out from his mother’s home.  He lived in a shared flat for 
a year.  Between 2002 and 2006, Breivik lived by himself in an apartment.214  During 
this period, sometime around 2002 or 2003, Breivik claims to have decided to go ahead 
with an armed resistance operation.  Also around 2002, Breivik claims in his 
compendium to have met with a group of other like-minded individuals in London. He 
had made contact with these individuals over the internet and claims to have eventually 
met with them in 2002 and several other subsequent occasions. These internet and in 
person contacts, Breivik claims, would ultimately lead to the founding of the PCCTS 
Knights Templar. Breivik claims after the last meeting, all contact with these individuals 
was cut off completely. He claims these meetings were more like training courses in 
order to plan an attack and that everyone was encouraged to manifest their resistance in 
their own way. Although Breivik claims these meetings existed, throughout the course of 
the subsequent criminal investigation and his trial, the prosecution disputed that these 
meetings ever took place and were unable to find any solid network connections between 
Breivik and others.215  
E. PLANNING THE ATTACK  
While living by himself in Oslo, Breivik began to operationally plan an armed 
resistance in 2002. Breivik started up several business ventures in order to finance his 
operation.  He founded several companies to act as legitimate surrogate companies to 
raise the finances needed to conduct an attack. His first business focused on outsourcing 
of programming services (with six employees in multiple countries).  His goal was to 
earn five million dollars for startup money in order to conduct an advanced operation. 
Breivik began earning money; however, the recession in 2005 and 2006 lowered his 
income margins.216   
In 2006, Breivik’s mother suggested he move back in with her in order to save 
money, as his companies were no longer as successful. Breivik agreed, and it is at this 
214 Ibid., 7. 
215 Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “A Post-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik,” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 10 
(2012): 18. 
216 Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 1380. 
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time he claims the idea of martyrdom struck him. In addition, he decided to take a year 
off and play videogames as a gift to himself, as it is something he had always wanted to 
do.217 While living with his mother, he played a year’s worth of World of Warcraft.  He 
additionally spent the next three years writing his compendium, 2083 A European 
Declaration of Independence. After 2006, between playing videogames and writing his 
compendium, Breivik slowly withdrew from his former life.  He distanced himself from 
almost everyone in order to write and plan his operation in secrecy.  He admits that it was 
very difficult to avoid the temptation of telling his closest friends about his plans.218 
However, he knew that as a Templar Knight that if he told his friends, this would be in 
violation of his oath.  Breivik stated, “I have almost lived a normal life up until now.  I 
still have close relationships with my friends and family, just not as tight as it used to 
be.”219 He describes his time as having been able to do things someone would not 
normally do (i.e., play World of Warcraft for a year). He describes rituals and meditations 
he took part in in order to remain motivated and committed to the cause.  Breivik’s most 
common ritual was taking long walks on a daily basis and listening to his favorite 
“motivating” music on his iPod.  This time provided him an opportunity to reflect and 
stay motivated.220 
After his compendium was complete in late 2009 or early 2010, Breivik began to 
more operationally prepare himself for the attack. Breivik began purchasing firearms, 
tactical equipment, and bomb making components.  During this time, he travelled 
throughout Europe in order to acquire firearms from known criminal networks; however, 
he would later determine it was easier to legally purchase his weapons in Norway.  
During 2011, Breivik once again moved from his mother’s home and moved all of his 
equipment to a farm he had rented in Asta where he would ultimately assemble the bomb.  
217 Ravndal, “A Pre-Trial Profile,” 7. 
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F. ISOLATION 
Breivik’s life shows instances of perceived isolation (the subjective lack of social 
support), emotional isolation (the lack of emotional connections), and social isolation (the 
lack of physical connections).  Breivik shows signs of perceived isolation and emotional 
isolation in the early years of his childhood and adult life, within his initial involvement 
phase.  He then self -imposed isolation in the initial engagement portion of his 
radicalization as a form of a parallel life, which was necessary in order to hide his true 
intentions. The following section will provide greater depth and detail into the periods of 
isolation throughout Breivik’s life. 
1. Initial Involvement 
Breivik’s childhood was deeply scrutinized in a 243-page forensic psychiatry 
report prepared by two experts nominated by Norwegian courts.221  Breivik’s parents 
separated when he was a young child and he was raised primarily by his mother. 
According to Ravndal, “The first years of Breivik’s life were marked by instability and 
an absent father figure.”222 Although Breivik claims in his compendium to have a 
privileged childhood, he also extensively writes of super-liberal matriarchal societies and 
fatherless societies. Breivik writes when referring to his upbringing by his mother ,”I do 
not approve of the super-liberal, matriarchal upbringing though as it completely lacked 
discipline and has contributed to feminise me to a certain degree.”223  He also spent a 
considerable amount of time referencing what fatherless civilizations create. He writes:  
The absence of fatherhood has created a society full of social pathologies, 
and the lack of male self-confidence has made us easy prey for our 
enemies. If the West is to survive, we need to reassert a healthy dose of 
male authority. In order to do so we need to roll back the welfare state. 
Perhaps we need to roll back some of the excesses of Western 
Feminism[13], too.224   
221 Ravndal, “A Pre-Trial Profile,” 6. 
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The extensive amount of time Breivik dedicated to these topics in his compendium 
suggests that he felt a lack of connection with his parents and slightly disapproved of the 
way in which he was raised.  
Breivik belonged to Progress Party, a political party from the ages of 16 to 21.  He 
left the group not because of their ideological views, but because of the means in which 
they chose to accomplish their views. Breivik decided the democratic means in which the 
Progress Party chose to accomplish their mission was fruitless, and he wanted to be part 
of an armed resistance with the same ideology.  Breivik’s decision to leave the group in 
terms of social identity theory offer considerable insight into his mentality. Breivik 
considered the Progress Party as his “in-group.” However, after determining the party 
would continue with democratic means and not take up an armed resistance, Breivik felt 
as if the party no longer provided a positive sense of self-worth. Breivik then used social 
mobility in order to leave the political party and join the “armed resistance;” the path that 
he felt was necessary.  Breivik perceived himself to be isolated in that the party did not 
share the same vision that he did (because they were not going to take up arms).  This 
instance in Breivik’s life highlights his need for support from those sharing the same 
views as he did.  Perceived isolation plays a large role in one’s outlook.  
Another important aspect in Breivik’s life was his compendium, in which he 
spoke extensively of the Knights Templar. Breivik formulated a group of like-minded 
individuals and wrote of meetings between them.  The investigation and trial of Breivik 
concluded that it is unlikely that the Knights Templar ever existed, and this was a 
misguided attempt of Breivik to cover another failed business venture. If viewed from a 
psychological standpoint Breivik’s creation of the Knights Templar highlights his need 
for acceptance and a support network.  
2. Initial Engagement 
Although it is questionable when Breivik did in fact decide to conduct an attack, 
he spent a considerable amount of time isolated in years prior.  Breivik is a classic 
example of an individual creating a parallel life in order to hide his true intentions and 
avoid detection.  He speaks extensively of operational necessities in creating a project or 
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an alibi to provide to family and friends that will “at least partly justify your ‘new pattern 
of activities’ (isolation/travel) while in the planning phase.”225 Breivik diminished his 
interactions with family and friends during his planning phase and explains he did not 
have a desire to create or preserve social connections. He explains:  
I spent three years were I focused on writing the compendium, 2083.  
During a 12 month period in the beginning, I also played World of 
Warcraft part time (which had been a dream for some time—hard core 
raiding:). I lived very ascetic and relatively isolated in the period.  These 
three years would also contribute to detach myself from my ‘old life’. It’s 
a process I used in order to isolate myself from most of my network, in 
preparation for the coming operation.  I feel that this period was needed in 
order to completely ‘detach myself from ‘the game’, my ‘former shallow 
consumerist lifestyle’ in order to ensure full focus on the matters at 
hand.226 
Breivik’s compendium also highlights the need for individuals to feel accepted 
and their existential need to be able to share their life experiences with others. You can 
see this through his regret to have diminished relationships with his friends. He explains:  
I left several aspects of my old life behind and had to completely re-
establish myself on an existential level.  It was hard because everyone I 
used to know felt I had abandoned them.  I never burned any bridges 
though which might explain why many of them are still pressuring me to 
‘come back.’ Obviously, I do not intend to.  If they knew my real 
intentions my cover would be blown and I would risk being exposed.  I 
cannot allow that to happen.227  
This example taken from Breivik’s compendium also highlights his dedication to 
his cause that no one else felt the same about.  
The court proceedings also questioned why Breivik gave up his financial 
activities as early as 2006.  His compendium claims it was because of the recession and 
that he was only doing it as startup money for the operation. However, the prosecution 
also believes that Breivik did not decide to become a terrorist until 2009 or 2010; which 
differs drastically from the information in his compendium. Is his compendium a means 
225 Ibid., 841. 
226 Ibid., 1380. 
227 Ibid., 1406. 
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to cover the fact that he failed as an entrepreneur? Several of Breivik’s close friends 
believed that Breivik suffered from depression (perceived isolation) and that is why he 
began to isolate himself. Although we do not know and probably never will know the 
answer to this, it shows that Breivik perception was important.  
When viewing Breivik’s path to radicalization, psychologist Fathali Moghaddam 
explains in his Staircase to Terrorism model that an individual’s perception of mobility 
greatly affects the path in which an individual travels. Moghaddam explains:  
Those who reach the first floor seek ways in which to improve their 
situation and achieve greater justice. But if they do not see possibilities for 
individual mobility and do not feel that they can adequately influence the 
procedures through which decisions are made, they are more likely to keep 
climbing.228  
Breivik saw targeted violence on Ethnic Norwegians throughout his childhood, 
which shaped his view on multiculturalism in Norway.  Breivik attempted to pursue a 
career in politics by joining the Progress Party who was anti-immigration; however, when 
Breivik realized his struggle against the Islamisation of Europe could not be 
accomplished through democratic means, he chose an armed resistance.  This can see 
through his compendium in which he states, “We do not want to do this, but we are left 
no choice.”229  
G. TERRORIST ACT 
On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik detonated a 2,100 pound car bomb in 
the Norwegian Government Quarter (including the Prime Minister’s Office) killing eight 
people and injuring another 98.230  Within hours of the bombing in Oslo, he travelled to 
the island of Utøya approximately 25 miles away.  Breivik took a ferry to the island, 
dressed in police attire (including a fake identification badge), and presented himself as a 
police officer to gain access to the island under the ruse that he was there to protect the 
228 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 162. 
229 Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 837. 
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island because of the day’s previous bombing.231 In subsequent interviews, Breivik 
claimed that Utøya was not his initial target. He originally intended to attack a 
Norwegian Press gathering, or the headquarters of the Norwegian Labor Party. When 
Breivik was unable to make three bombs (as initially intended), he decided on an armed 
assault at Utøya.  Utøya was selected both because he considered it an indoctrination of 
young adults supporting multiculturalism and because of the prominent Labor Party 
politicians who were scheduled to attend.232 At Utøya, he killed another 69 individuals 
and injured another 60;233 an act he claims was driven by his love for Europe, European 
culture and all Europeans.234 Anders Behring Breivik was apprehended on the island of 
Utøya on July 22, 2011. He was subsequently tried and convicted of these crimes and 
sentenced to 21 years in prison.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Through the psychiatric evaluations of Breivik, his 1,500 page compendium, and 
the criminal trial, a significant amount of information was learned about Breivik, 
although a lot still remains unanswered.  Breivik was not the typical loner.235 He acted 
alone, but was not socially isolated.  In fact, the trial revealed that Breivik was well liked 
and considered a caring individual amongst his close network of friends.236 Breivik’s 
compendium suggests he had a wonderful family life and was successful in life and 
business, all of which has since been proven otherwise.  However, Breivik’s perception 
of ideological support shows that an individual’s perception of support available to them 
(perceived isolation) is an important factor the path that someone chooses to take. Breivik 
stopped viewing democratic means as a viable option to alter the course of  
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multiculturalism in Norway.  He felt as if he no other choice and lacked support in his 
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VI. OMAR HAMMAMI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Omar Hammami, a former resident of Daphne, Alabama, was originally indicted 
by the Southern District of Alabama in 2007 on terrorism violations. On December 13, 
2007, a federal warrant was issued for Hammami’s arrest.237 A superseding indictment 
was returned against Hammami in September of 2009, in which he was charged with 
providing support to terrorists, conspiring to provide material support to a State 
Department-designated foreign terrorist organization (al-Shabaab), and providing 
material support to al-Shabaab.238  Al-Shabaab, designated by the State Department as a 
foreign terrorist organization on February 26, 2008,239 has committed attacks throughout 
Somalia. Al-Shabaab has recently attempted to align themselves with the al-Qa’ida 
network240 and are dedicated to expanding the reach of al-Shabaab outside of Somalia.241  
Hammami, also known as Abu Mansur al-Amriki or “The American,”242 adopted 
a conservative Salafi school of thought and pursued da’wah—calling others to Islam.243 
Hammami’s ultimate path of radicalization took him from being an average American 
237 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Most Wanted Terrorists—Omar Shafik Hammami (Washington, 
DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
238 U.S. State Department, “Rewards for Justice: Reward Offers for Information on Omar Hammami 
and Jehad Mostafa,” accessed October 9, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206565.htm; 
United States v. Omar Shafik Hammami, Grand Jury Indictment of Omar Shafik Hammami, 1 (Southern 
District of AL, Southern Division 2009), 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1357.pdf, 1.  
239 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Designation of Al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization,” Federal Register 73, no. 53 (2008), U.S. Department of State, accessed October 10, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/102446.htm. 
240 Andre Le Sage, Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock (Washington, DC: Institute 
for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2010), 2. 
241 Security and Governance in Somalia: Consolidating Gains, Confronting Challenges and Charting 
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(2013), (testimony of Andre Le Sage), 
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teenager to travelling abroad to fight for a foreign terrorist organization in Somalia. This 
chapter will provide an overview of Hammami’s life in order to address the specific 
phases throughout his radicalization in which he experienced isolation.  
B. CHILDHOOD 
Omar Shafik Hammami was born on May 6, 1984 to Debra Hadley and Shafik 
Hammami.  Omar’s father, Shafik, was a Syrian immigrant who came to the United 
States as a teenager in 1972. Shafik came to the United States on a visa to study medicine 
in southern Alabama. Southern Alabama’s historically conservative culture appealed to 
Shafik’s conservative Arab upbringing. He settled in this area and met Debra Hadley 
through mutual friends.244 Debra was described by her son as a “typical southern 
protestant girl” who appealed to his father’s conservative background.245  Hammami 
continues to explain his father’s conservative background was from his Arab culture, not 
his Islamic faith.246 Debra and Shafik married and had two children: Dena, who is three 
years older than her brother Omar.  Shafik did not become a doctor; rather, he became a 
successful civil engineer, and Debra became a primary school teacher.247  In his 
autobiography released in 2012, Hammami regards his upbringing as being “like most of 
the privileged children in America.”248  
Shafik Hammami was not raised in a strict religious family, but his home with 
Debra was culturally Muslim.249  Shafik tried to teach the children Arabic and Islam, but 
it did not resonate. Debra would take the children to church with her, which at first was 
without her husband’s knowledge.250 Hammami regards going to church with his mother 
244 Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times, January 27, 2010. 
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as a child to be a shaping influence in his life.251 At age six, Hammami was baptized in 
the Perdido Baptist Church. In an interview with Hammami’s sister Dena, she refers to 
the differences in culture, “It was like two different schools of thought under one roof, 
thunder and lightning.”252  
As a young child, Hammami spent time going to church and bible study with his 
mother and sister. He memorized all of the names of the books of the bible and attended 
bible camp. He spent time celebrating holidays with his mother’s side of the family and 
would hunt and spend time outdoors. In his autobiography, Hammami regarded this time 
as “an escape to the quaint country from my snobbish suburban atmosphere.”253 
Hammami had a very close relationship with his sister growing up. He explains, 
“My sister and I were pretty close. She likens it to us being a bit like twins.”254 They 
were both active soccer players and spent a lot of time together. Hammami was regarded 
as having a very active mind and a very intelligent, charismatic child. He was put into 
advanced classes at a young age. As children, Shafik led a strict household, but as the 
children became adolescents, Shafik found it more difficult to keep the children on a 
modest path.255 The children changed grade schools around the time Hammami was in 
sixth grade.256  Hammami regards this as a turning point in his life. He states, “I went 
from being one of the most popular children in school to being a virtual no body. For the 
first time in my life I was standing at the break area without a single friend.”257  But by 
the seventh grade at his new school in Daphne, Alabama, he was able to make friends and 
became the class vice-president. Hammami regards himself as the “most popular guy in 
school” by the eighth grade.  He said he was a social butterfly who used to hop from 
circle to circle and associate with all types of people.258 
251 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One, 6. 
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As Hammami grew into his teenage years, he began studying Islam. He was 
conflicted with his traditional Baptist upbringing and Islam. Around the same time, his 
father Shafik had a renewed sense of faith after having drifted away from practice in his 
college years.  Shafik began attending a mosque in Mobile and became an active member 
in the growing Muslim community in the area.259 As Hammami was entering his high 
school years, he became more devout in his newly found faith. 
C. HIGH SCHOOL YEARS 
In his autobiography, Hammami refers to his ninth grade year at Daphne High as 
a transitional year. Hammami began praying at school, and for the first time, he had to 
pray in front of all of his friends “despite being the only Muslim in a southern suburban 
town.”260 Despite all of his internal conflict, Hammami was very popular. 
Hammami was elected his sophomore class president, and he described his tenth 
grade year as one of clarity. He visited Syria the summer before his tenth grade year and 
spent more and more time attending the mosque. When he began his tenth grade year, he 
had different classes than most of his friends.  When Hammami had available time to 
socialize with his friends (lunch break or midday break), he spent his time praying. This 
distance from his friends made him re-evaluate those friendships. As prayer was 
beginning to take up more and more of his free time, he referred to this time as an upward 
battle. Hammami then became friends with another student at Daphne High named 
Bernie Culveyhouse, who became interested in Islam.  In a documentary of Hammami’s 
life, Culveyhouse reflects on the time when Hammami came back from Syria and began 
praying at school and the subsequent distance this created with his friends. He relayed, 
“Omar expected to be the cool kid. He didn’t expect too many things to change. When he 
saw that he wasn’t in the in-crowd and people didn’t get him, it messed with him.”261 
259 Elliott, The Jihadist Next Door. 
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When Hammami went back to school in the eleventh grade, he dreaded it. In his 
autobiography, he reflected on this time stating: “Of course, I still had good grades, and 
so forth, but I tried to limit my relationships with the disbelievers that surrounded me. At 
times it was very depressing.”262 This year, Hammami also began to attend the Friday 
prayer at the mosque. Around this time, there was also an incident that occurred where 
Hammami choked a classmate who he felt was being disrespectful to his religion. 
Hammami was suspended from school because of this incident.263  Hammami finished 
out the eleventh grade at Daphne High. Hammami, with high grades and a score in the 
ninety-third percentile on his ACT and was able to skip the twelth grade.  Hammami 
enrolled in nearby University of South Alabama.264     
D. COLLEGE YEARS 
In 2001, Hammami attended the University of South Alabama, which he viewed 
as a breath of fresh air compared to high school.265 He could wear his Islamic clothes, he 
was not in class with the same old people, and he was just minutes away from the local 
mosque. Hammami was also president of the Muslim Student Association. After the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred Hammami, as president of the Muslim 
Student Association, was interviewed reference the attacks. In the school’s newspaper, 
Hammami was quoted as saying, “It’s difficult to believe a Muslim could have done 
this.” 266 Friend, Bernie Culveyhouse, reflects on this time saying it was sometimes 
tumultuous, “I’ve never felt that much rejection on a public level in my life.”267 
Hammami and Culveyhouse had adopted a non-militant salafi view of Islam.  
They began practicing their faith with greater devotion. They began living by a very strict 
code; they were unable to look at women, listen to music, be photographed, or sleep with 
262 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One, 15. 
263 Elliott, The Jihadist Next Door. 
264 Ibid. 
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their backsides facing Mecca.268 Shafik found some of his son’s new beliefs as 
“theologically debatable.”  In addition, around this time, Hammami also had a falling out 
with his father due to ideological interpretations. Hammami refused to pose for a family 
portrait, and he was not welcome back into their family home. Hammami lived in a 
storage unit for two weeks without electricity or water. Bernie and Omar eventually 
moved in together in a low-income housing structure where their commitment to Islam 
only intensified.269  
Bernie and Hammami worked several odd jobs, but they soon found it was 
difficult to find employment that aligned with their newfound religious beliefs. Bernie 
and Hammami had also begun travelling throughout the country attending Islamic 
conferences. Hammami had decided he did not want to attend a secular college; rather, he 
wanted to study religion. Hammami began reading salafi books and articles. Hammami 
became disillusioned with the Western lifestyle and wanted to get married as soon as 
possible.270 Hammami had also decided not to pursue his degree in medicine.  One day, 
he disenrolled from the university.271 
Around the same time, Hammami travelled back to Syria with his father to meet 
his uncle Rafiiq, who had been released from prison. Hammami writes that this 
experience gave Hammami more of a hatred for the disbelieving rulers of the Muslim 
countries. He claims it also gave him an urge to free Muslim prisoners from around the 
world. 272 When Hammami came back to America without employment and without 
school, he decided it was time for a change. He proclaimed, “I had become so averse to 
America that I wanted to leave.”273 Bernie had left the United States for Canada and had 
gotten married to a Somali woman.  A year later, Hammami followed him to Toronto. 
268 Elliott, The Jihadist Next Door. 
269 Putzel, Tanner, and Maroney, Vanguard: American Jihadi, mins. 17:48–18:10. 
270 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One. 
271 Ibid., 18. 
272 Ibid., 22. 
273 Ibid., 24. 
 74 
                                                 
E. ON THE MOVE 
1. Canada 
Drawn to freedom and acceptance of the big city after being marginalized in 
Daphne—Hammami decided to move to Toronto, Canada. After arriving in Toronto, 
Hammami immediately found employment delivering milk to the Somali community. 
Delivering milk did not last too long, and he then began delivering pizzas in the Somali 
community. While in Toronto, Bernie and Hammami immersed themselves in the 
accepting Somali community. Bernie then introduced Hammami to his sister-in-law 
Sadiyo Mohamed Abdille.274   
While in Toronto, Hammami and Bernie discovered an Islamic bookstore in 
which they spent hours. Hammami recalls reading Islamic books “from morning till 
night.”275 Now in a culture that Bernie regarded as “openly critical of the west,”276 
Hammami’s political views were growing more extreme. Hammami was introduced to 
Amir Khattab, a legendary jihadist who fought in Chechnya.277 Bernie reflects, “I think 
Omar related to him. He saw him as a really inspiring guy. He was sincerely devoting his 
life to furthering the cause of Muslims. I could just see it in his eyes, Omar had found a 
new hero.”278  
In March of 2005, just two months after having met, Hammami and Sadiyo were 
married in a small ceremony. Hammami had invited his father, mother, sister, and 
brother-in-law to the wedding, who all attended.279 Hammami found it increasingly 
difficult to live amongst Muslims he deemed less devote than himself.  While at the 
wedding, Hammami announced to his father that he was making hijra—or migration to a 
Muslim land. Culveyhouse had suggested they travel to Egypt so they could study Islam 
274 Elliott, The Jihadist Next Door. 
275 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One, 28. 
276 Putzel, Tanner, and Maroney, Vanguard: American Jihadi, min 25:00. 
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at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo.280 Between the wedding and the move to 
Egypt, Hammami’s wife had become pregnant. After less than a year in Toronto, they 
would land in Egypt in search of a pure Islamic existence. 
2. Egypt 
In 2005, Hammami along with his pregnant wife, and the Culveyhouse family 
travelled to Alexandria, Egypt. While there, they had a difficult time finding adequate 
housing and found Egypt to be more secular than expected. Hammami and 
Culveyhouse’s applications at the university fell through. Hammami found odd jobs in 
hopes of earning enough money to find a decent place to live. After having several odd 
jobs, their time in Egypt changed.  Bernie decided to move his family back to the United 
States and Hammami’s pregnant wife became very lonely without the Culveyhouses. 
Hammami worked to get money for a new apartment but had a difficult time supporting 
his family. Hammami also spent a considerable amount of time at an internet café.281 He 
became increasingly pre-occupied with events unfolding in Somalia. The Islamic Courts 
Union was on the brink of seizing control of Somalia and had promised to unite the 
country under the banner of Islam.282 In an email interview corresponded through an 
intermediary, Hammami wrote he was yearning to live in a country “where Shariah was 
being implemented completely.”283 
While in Alexandria, Hammami eventually met another American convert living 
in Egypt, Daniel Maldonado, or Abu Muxammad al-Amriiki.284 Maldonado and 
Hammami began studying together and reportedly began attending “underground 
mosques.”285  Hammami had decided he wanted to move to Somalia; however, his wife 
did not want to make the move. Hammami’s wife then gave birth to their baby girl. 
Hammami’s parents came to visit Egypt during the month of Ramadhaan.  While there, 
280 Elliott, The Jihadist Next Door. 
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Hammami was busy finishing his plans to move to Somalia. In 2006, Hammami told his 
family he was travelling to Dubai for a couple days in order to look for work. Instead, 
Hammami went to Somalia as several other Americans have done.286 Over the past years, 
upwards of 20 U.S. persons have travelled to Somalia to fight and train with al-
Shabaab.287 
3. Somalia 
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized control of portions of Somalia, 
after it had been dominated by competing warlords and clan based conflicts since 1991.  
The ICU promised to unite the country under the banner of Islam, and it brought a sense 
of peace to the country, after years of chaos.288 Al-Shabaab or “the youth” became the 
self-appointed vanguard force within the ICU and was believed to have ties with al-
Qa’ida.289  Soon after, thousands of Ethiopian forces gathered at the Somali border, with 
backing from the United States. The Ethiopian troops eventually invaded Somalia and 
gained control of the capital city, Mogadishu.290 An insurgency was born as a call for a 
jihad was issued to drive out the Christian invaders.291 In 2007, al-Shabaab emerged as a 
movement independent from the ICU.292 
In November of 2006, Hammami arrived in Somalia and lived for a short period 
of time with relatives of his wife, Sadiyo.  Hammami contacted his wife, who still in 
Egypt, and told her that he travelled to Somalia to visit her relatives, but that his passport 
had been stolen and he could not return home immediately.293 Hammami reflects in 
autobiography that when the news of his travel to Somalia made it back to his father, his 
286 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One, 38. 
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father called Sadiyo’s relatives so that he could speak to his son. Shafik Hammami was 
distraught over his son’s decision and told him to come home, as it was not his war to 
fight. Hammami states that he eventually told his father that he was there for jihad. 
Around the same time, Hammami’s wife and daughter moved back to Canada.294   
The day Hammami found out his wife and daughter had moved back to Canada, 
Hammami writes about chance encounter with Daniel Maldonado.  Maldonado took 
Hammami to a house with other men who said they were “the Shabaab.” Hammami 
states in his autobiography:  
I was extremely excited once again, but I found it very ironic.  I had been 
charged with preparing the way for Abu Muxammad and his family and I 
had been trying to save him from the airport and so forth. However, the 
reality of the situation was that he had saved me from this frustrating 
lifestyle (living with non-religious people in a bad area) and prepared the 
way for me to realize the dream of joining the Jihaad.295 
After some time in Somalia, Hammami was preparing to be married for a second 
time. Around the same time, the men told them they would be travelling to Kismayo. 
Kismayo, a port city in southern Somalia, proved to be an important area for al-Shabaab 
to control.  Control of Kismayo and its port are believed to have provided al-Shabaab 
with a considerable amount of revenue in order to finance its operations.296  It was on the 
way preparing for the trip to Kismayo that Hammami was given his AKM and a 
magazine full of bullets.297 Hammami then disappeared, his whereabouts and activity 
unknown.   
Hammami reappeared in the fall of 2007 when a story, featured by Al Jazeera the 
Arabic news channel, interviewed al-Shabaab fighters from the field.  Hammami 
appeared in this video with his face half covered and spoke in English.  Since then, 
Hammami has appeared in numerous on-line videos, three of which were officially 
released by al-Shabaab’s media department.  Hammami became known as the English 
294 al-Amriiki, “The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One,” 44. 
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speaking Western face of al-Shabaab.  Hammami, “The American” can also be heard 
rapping in al-Shabaab videos and became an important part in the recruitment of young 
westerners to the cause of jihad.298  
F. ISOLATION 
Throughout his life, Omar Hammami experienced numerous instances of 
isolation.  Through his autobiography, Hammami provides his perspective on his 
childhood and subsequent periods of isolation that he experienced. Hammami 
experienced all three types of isolation studied; social, emotional, and perceived isolation. 
The following section will provide an in depth look at these periods of isolation and how 
they affected Hammami’s propensity to become radicalized.  
1. Initial Involvement 
During his childhood, Hammami appeared to have a typical relationship with his 
family and friends.  Though Hammami was raised in both a Christian and Muslim home, 
this appears to have caused internal conflict for Hammami when deciding what religion 
to pursue. When Hammami ultimately decided to become Muslim, this caused him to 
experience emotional, perceived, and social isolation.   
When Hammami began praying at school he experienced what he perceived as 
rejection by his peers.  Hammami began spending more time praying at school, which 
reduced the amount of available time he had to spend with his friends causing social 
isolation.  In his autobiography, he wrote:  
This distance from those ‘friends’ caused me to realize a lot of things. 
Those ‘friends’ only cared about me so long as I was in their face making 
them laugh.  They also only cared about me so long as I was a Christian or 
something close to it. That led me to use more of my lunch time for prayer 
and remembrance of God.  The last resort I had to socialize was break 
time and by that point I had become so alienated that I began praying 
during that time as well.299 
298Anzalone, “The Evolution of an American Jihadi,” 10–13. 
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The social isolation he experienced also came coupled with a sense of perceived 
isolation and rejection.  He perceived isolation can be seen through his reaction to an 
incident in high school in which he felt his religion was being made fun of.  Hammami 
physically assaulted another student he felt was rejecting both he and his religion.  While 
Hammami struggled to fit in in high school because of his decision to become Muslim, he 
suffered from a profound sense of emotional isolation as well as feeling as if he did not 
have anyone that understood him or supported him.  Hammami wrote, “I was already fed 
up with school and no one, not even my Muslim father, understood me.”300 
This sense of emotional and perceived isolation can also be seen in his decision to 
leave high school a year early. Hammami recalls struggling with his decision to leave 
high school early when a counselor attempted to talk to Hammami about staying in high 
school and getting a scholarship. Hammami wrote, “I felt like crying out of my 
loneliness.” Hammami was in search of a place where he felt he fit it—the University of 
South Alabama became the answer.  There, Hammami was able to wear his Islamic 
clothes, he was just minutes away from the mosque, and he became president of the 
Muslim Student Association.  While attending the University of South Alabama seemed 
as a breath of fresh air for Hammami, its appeal did not last long.  After the terror attacks 
of 9/11, Hammami again felt a sense of rejection from the community.   
When Hammami and his friend Bernie Culveyhouse moved to Canada, he 
felt a sense of kinship with the Somali community. When reflecting on the 
Somali community, he stated “The Somaalis were really the best 
community I had come across—whether it was the ones in Atlanta or 
Toronto—and I found serenity in those Masaajid the most. But the Somali 
community was also not without its Western defects.”301  These Western 
defects proved to again isolate Hammami from his dream of living in a 
pure Islamic society.  When referring to his decision to ultimately leave 
Canada for Egypt he says: The fact that I was now living in a multicultural 
metropolis really helped my attempt of trying new things and melting 
down the artificial barriers. I was happy for quite a while until I realized 
that even this is not enough. Obviously it was never a pure Islaamic  
 
 
300 Ibid., 16. 
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society by any stretch of the imagination, but it served as a temporary 
haven for me while I digested new information and formed new plans for 
my future.302 
2. Initial Engagement 
While Hammami and Culveyhouse were in Egypt attempting to study at a 
religious university, they again became disillusioned with the lifestyle they found in 
Egypt. Culveyhouse made the decision to move his family back to Canada from Egypt, 
while Hammami continued to immerse himself in internet forums.  While radicalizing 
online, Hammami also began to lead a parallel life and isolate himself from his family 
and friends.  Hammami and Daniel Maldonado began secretly planning to leave Egypt 
for Somalia. Hammami kept his plans a secret and left Egypt under the guise of looking 
for work in Dubai.  Hammami states:  
They had no idea that this would probably be the last time to see their 
child. I wanted to inform them, but I knew that if I did they would do 
anything in their power to keep their, and their new granddaughter away 
from the war zone in Somaalia.303 
Hammami’s eventual move to Somalia led him to a place where he finally felt 
accepted—with al-Shabaab. His sense of perceived and emotional isolation had been 
fulfilled with people who supported the same ideas that he did.  While in Somalia, 
Hammami continued to lead a parallel life and began cutting himself off from his former 
lifestyle and continuing to radicalize.  Hammami went underground for a period of time 
and then re-emerged as a charismatic leader. Hammami used the internet and western 
ways (speaking English and rap songs) in order to recruit other young western 
individuals. Through this, he was able to offer the support to others that he longed to have 
throughout his adolescence and young adult life.  
In his autobiography, Hammami answers questions regarding his experiences in 
Somalia. He confirms that the move to Somalia fulfilled his sense of perceived and 
emotional isolation. He explains,  “I also gained a lot of acquaintances and relationships 
302 Ibid., 110–111. 
303 Ibid., 38. 
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that are priceless and I have had the honor of knowing some of the most righteous men of 
our times.”304  Although Hammami had been satisfied in Somalia fighting for al-
Shabaab, that too came to an end.  In a public release of a Youtube video dated March 16, 
2012, Hammami stated he feared for his life following a dispute with al-Shabaab over 
“shari’a and strategy.”305 
G. TERRORIST ACT 
The FBI added Hammami to their Most Wanted List in November 2012.306 On 
July 29, 2011, Hammami was additionally added to the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s U.S. Government’s Specially Designated Nationals list, which provides 
authority to block the property of and prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions 
with, individuals and entities whose actions threaten the peace, security, or stability of 
Somalia.307  Hammami is believed to have been involved in the organizing of a suicide 
bombing carried out by Somali-American from Minnesota who travelled to Somalia with 
the intent of joining al-Shabaab. The attack (conducted in October 2008) and four 
additional attacks, believed to be organized by Hammami, killed more than 20 people.308  
H. CONCLUSION 
Despite the attention Hammami received in the media, his role within al-Shabaab 
has been widely debated and unclear.309 Hammami has been referred to as a military 
tactician, recruitment strategist, financial manager, and, most recently, a strategist.310  
Regardless of Hammami’s exact role in the organization, he played an important part in 
al-Shabaab’s ability to recruit young English speaking individuals to their call for jihad. 
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After Hammami’s public split from al-Shabaab in 2012, rumors of an attack on 
Hammami and his associates from al-Shabaab spread rapidly.  In several subsequent 
interviews with Hammami, he stated he was hiding out from al-Shabaab forces intent on 
killing him.  A tweet posted on September 15, 2013 on the account of @abumamerican, 
(an account believed to be used by Omar Hammami) stated, “We confirm the martyrdom 
of Omar Hammami in the morning of Thur 12 2013. Shafik’s family please accept our 
codolences.”311 The review of Omar Hammami’s life can provide insight into the stages 
of isolation Hammami experienced throughout his life, in an attempt to understand how 
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“The life of the true, political terrorist is a hard and lonely one”312 
This chapter will address the commonalities in regards to isolation seen 
throughout the case studies of Timothy McVeigh, Anders Behring Breivik, and Omar 
Hammami.  Each individual experienced isolation throughout their lives.  Although each 
individual’s isolation was manifested in different ways, each individual continued on his 
path to radicalization, also continuing to be isolated throughout their path.  The following 
will outline the episodes of isolation each individual has faced, whether that is social, 
emotional, or perceived isolation.  In order to provide a better understanding of how 
isolation impacts the radicalization process, this chapter will outline the type of isolation 
each individual experienced specific to whether it was during the initial involvement 
phase or the initial engagement phase.  By categorizing the isolation into one of these 
phases, it will allow homeland security officials the opportunity to better understand the 
radicalization process and the time during someone’s life that isolation played a role. By 
comparing three very different individuals, with three different upbringings and three 
different ideologies we can view the commonalities in regards to isolation that exist 
throughout the path of radicalization.  
B. INITIAL INVOLVEMENT 
The initial involvement phase of radicalization showed that each individual 
suffered from social isolation, emotional isolation, and perceived isolation.  These 
periods of isolation drastically affected each individual and their perspective, their 
outlook on life, and the choices they felt they had.  Rejection by their peers or family and 
lack of emotional connections had profound effects on each individual.  The following 
section will outline in detail specific instances of isolation that each individual faced 
during the initial involvement phase of their radicalization. 
312 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 44. 
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1. Social Isolation 
Each individual experienced episodes of social isolation throughout his adolescent 
years.  Social isolation can be defined as social connectedness or an objective measure of 
contacts with other people.313 Timothy McVeigh spent a significant amount of time alone 
as a child.  His parents both spent considerable amounts of time away from the home 
while they focused on their careers.  After his parents divorced, McVeigh chose to live 
with his father, who was forced to work in order to support the family. His mother also 
spent a significant amount of time at work as a travel agent.  Between their two careers 
and the divorce, Timothy spent countless hours by himself, which conditioned him to be 
a loner.314  As McVeigh grew older he still isolated himself, even when he was amongst 
peers.  McVeigh’s time in the military shows that he again was socially isolated; he spent 
countless hours reading equipment manuals and playing video games while the rest of his 
unit was out partying on the weekends.    
Anders Behring Breivik too had a troubled childhood.  The divorce of Breivik’s 
parents left him in the custody of his mother.  Psychological documents from Breivik’s 
early childhood indicate his mother was having a difficult time raising her son.  After a 
month long stay in the National Centre for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (SSBU), the 
psychologist suggested Anders be removed from his mother’s care.  The psychologist 
also described Anders as “avoiding contact, a passive and anxious little child, with a 
manic defense characterized by restless activity and a fake, deprecating smile.”315  
During a post-incident interview with Breivik’s former stepmother, she reflects on an 
incident when Breivik was young.  She recalled receiving a telephone call from the 
neighbors of Breivik in Oslo.  The neighbor said that the kids spent too much time alone, 
and there was too much trouble there. It was after this incident that Breivik’s father and 
313 Havens et al., “Social Isolation,” 130. 
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stepmother attempted to gain custody of Breivik, which ultimately did not occur.316 
Breivik’s path to violence still remains unclear. In Breivik’s compendium, he claims to 
have started the planning of an armed resistance around 2002 or 2003, and that in 2007 
he decided to become a martyr.  However, the subsequent investigation shows that he 
may have started planning the attacks as late as 2009 or 2010. During this time, Breivik 
went through a significant period of self-imposed isolation by moving back into his 
mother’s home and playing World of Warcraft while also distancing himself from 
friends.  Breivik claims this period of isolation was to prepare himself for his attack, 
however, the possibility exists that this too was a misrepresentation on Breivik’s behalf. 
He may have moved back home because of his failed business ventures and was 
distraught over his inability to be successful; isolating himself instead, in an attempt to 
save face.  
Omar Hammami also spent time alone during his adolescent years. Hammami 
seemingly had a normal childhood, despite living in a household encompassing two very 
different cultures.  Hammami was intelligent, charismatic, and popular amongst his peers. 
He was active in sports and school functions. However, when Hammami converted to 
Islam, he became socially isolated from his peers. As Hammami became more stringent 
in his faith, he began praying at school, which took up more and more time of his free 
time. The time he would have to socialize with his friends, Hammami spent praying by 
himself. As he became distanced from his peers, he spent more and more time isolated.    
The social isolation of these individuals varies considerably.  While McVeigh 
spent a lot of time alone as a child, Breivik has been regarded by his peers as very social, 
and Hammami was not socially isolated until his convert to Islam.  The social isolation of 
these individuals does not appear to have contributed to their radicalization as much as 
their emotional and perceived isolation did.  However, their social isolation directly 
corresponds with the emotional and perceived isolation these individuals experienced.  It 
is difficult to completely separate the types of isolation into distinctive categories.  There 
316 Torgeir Husby and Synne Sørheim, “Anders Behring Breivik Psychiatric Report 2011-11-29,” 
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is a considerable amount of overlap between the types of isolation and the three types of 
isolation have a causal relationship. The social isolation these individuals experienced 
also affected their emotional isolation and perceived isolation.  Because they were 
socially isolated and became distanced from others, this contributed to their emotional 
isolation and ultimately their perceived isolation.   
2. Emotional Isolation 
Emotional isolation is represented by the subjective degree an individual feels 
emotionally connected with others.  Emotional isolation may also represent “a gap 
between one’s ideal level of social relationships and their actual level of social 
relationships.”317  Each individual also suffered from emotional isolation throughout his 
life. Timothy McVeigh’s case study displayed the drastic effects emotional isolation had 
throughout his life.  Because of his parents working, this caused McVeigh emotional 
isolation.  He felt as if he never had a parent to talk to when he came home from school.  
He commented that he had very few memories of interactions with his parents.318  
McVeigh’s experiences with bullies throughout his life also drastically altered his view 
and made it difficult for him to emotionally connect with people. As McVeigh’s life 
progressed he continued to have difficulty connecting with people.  Even as he became 
an adult McVeigh struggled to connect with women and friends on an intimate level.  As 
McVeigh became more radical, his emotional isolation could be seen through a letter he 
wrote to his sister in 1993, stating he had “an urgent need for someone in the family to 
understand me.”319   
Anders Breivik experienced emotional isolation throughout his life as well. 
Although Breivik claims in his compendium to have a privileged childhood, this has been 
disputed by the courts and psychologists who performed interviews with Breivik.  His 
lack of connection with his parents can also be seen in his compendium in he writes 
extensively writes on super-liberal matriarchal societies and fatherless societies. Breivik 
317 Stack, “Marriage, Family and Loneliness,” 416. 
318 Michel, Herbeck, and Telles, American Terrorist, 21. 
319 Ibid., 144–145.  
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felt as if the way in which his mother raised him lacked discipline and the super-liberal 
matriarchal upbringing feminized him. 320  He also writes of fatherless societies that have 
created societies full of males who lack the confidence needed, which has in turn made 
them easy prey for the “enemies.”321 The extensive amount of time Breivik dedicated to 
these topics in his compendium suggests that he felt a lack of connection with his parents 
and disapproved of his upbringing.   
Omar Hammami’s emotional isolation can be seen through several quotes from 
his autobiography.  During his conversion to Islam, he felt isolated from his peers and his 
family.  He writes, “I was already fed up with school and no one, not even my Muslim 
father, understood me.”322 As Hammami became more and more socially isolated by 
spending all of his free time praying, this also caused him to experience emotional 
isolation. His lack of connection with his peers can be seen when he stated, “Of course, I 
still had good grades, and so forth, but I tried to limit my relationships with the 
disbelievers that surrounded me. At times it was very depressing.”323  
3. Perceived Isolation 
Perceived isolation is a perceived lack of social support and is based on the 
subjective experiences of the individual.324 Perceived support can be viewed in both the 
satisfaction with support provided, and the degree to which one feels they will be 
supported in the future if needed.  The perceived isolation these individuals experienced 
drastically altered the way they perceived the options they had available to them.  They 
felt as if they did not have adequate support in their lives or their belief systems, which 
affected the path they choose. As shown through previous terrorism research and the 
preceding case studies, the path to radicalization manifests differently for all individuals.  
However, one central theme is the perceived isolation or lack of support these individuals 
felt they had available to them.  Perceived isolation can encompass emotional isolation or 
320 Berwick, 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, 1387. 
321 Ibid., 363. 
322 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One, 16. 
323 Ibid., 15.  
324 Cornwell and Waite, “Social Disconnectedness,” 32. 
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the lack of emotional connections these individuals had with others.  However, perceived 
isolation also encompasses many things other than emotional connections.  Perceived 
isolation can be related to the lack of support they felt for perceived injustices perpetrated 
against them and lack of support in their belief systems.  Perceived isolation has shown to 
play an important role in the initial involvement phase of radicalization.  
Despite being referred to as the best time in his life, Timothy McVeigh’s military 
career also showed signs of perceived isolation. In 1991, McVeigh abruptly left the 
Army, citing one of his reasons as the lack of cohesion he felt like Charlie Company had 
developed.  McVeigh had also become disenchanted with Army life after he dropped out 
of the Special Forces program.  While this was a personal choice on McVeigh’s behalf, 
Special Forces was what he aspired to be—a team working together on important 
operations. By washing out of Special Forces, he was subsequently isolated from his 
perceived in-group. He then became even more disenchanted with the lack of cohesion of 
Charlie Company, and finally left the Army all together.   
As McVeigh progressed into radicalization, his perceived isolation became more 
prominent.  McVeigh began to disassociate himself with people he felt did not share his 
same beliefs or path; most notably his childhood friend Steve Hodge.  McVeigh wrote:  
Those who betray or subvert the Constitution are guilty of sedition and/or 
treason, are domestic enemies and should and will be punished 
accordingly. It also stands to reason that anyone who sympathizes with the 
enemy or gives aid or comfort to said enemy is likewise guilty. I have 
sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign 
and domestic and I will. And I will because not only did I swear to, but I 
believe in what it stands for in every bit of my heart, soul and being. I 
know in my heart that I am right in my struggle, Steve. I have come to 
peace with myself, my God and my cause. Blood will flow in the streets, 
Steve. Good vs. Evil. Free Men vs. Socialist Wannabe Slaves. Pray it is 
not your blood, my friend. 325   
This step to disassociate himself with anyone who did not believe what he believed was a 
major turning point for McVeigh.  
325 Michel, Herbeck, and Telles, American Terrorist, 154. 
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Anders Breivik’s perceived isolation also played a large role in his outlook and 
opportunities, he felt were available to him. Breivik was a member in the Progress 
Political party and mentions in his compendium a desire to have a future in politics.  
Breivik decided the democratic means in which the Progress Party chose to accomplish 
their mission was fruitless, and he wanted to be part of an armed resistance with the same 
ideology.  However, after determining the party would continue with democratic means 
and not take up an armed resistance, Breivik felt as if the party no longer provided a 
positive sense of self-worth.  Breivik perceived himself to be isolated as the party did not 
share the same vision that he did (because they were not going to take up arms).  This 
instance in Breivik’s life highlights his need for support from those sharing the same 
views as he did.  Breivik’s self-presentation of his life in his compendium also suggests 
he had an inflated self-esteem. Breivik spent a great deal of time trying to prove his self-
worth to his family and friends.  He dressed in expensive clothes and placed a very high 
importance on his physical appearance. Breivik also invested a good portion of his time 
on his business ventures to prove his intelligence and self-worth. He writes of a good 
family situation and upbringing, which the courts eventually determined not to be true. 
Breivik’s business ventures were not as successful as he had anticipated, and Breivik also 
considered having plastic surgery to enhance his appearance. The amount of time in his 
life and compendium Breivik dedicated to prove his self-worth displays Breivik need for 
notoriety and acceptance.  
Hammami’s perceived isolation was evident in his decision to leave high school a 
year early.  Hammami felt as if he longer “fit in” at his high school and felt as if neither 
he nor his new religion was accepted by his peers or teachers.  Hammami choose to 
attend a university where there was a larger Muslim population and where he was able to 
meet new individuals supportive of his new faith. Hammami’s desires to have his faith 
supported led him from community to community.  He eventually was in search of a pure 
Islamic society.  Not fitting in anywhere ultimately led him to Somalia for this perfect 
society.  He then became engaged in a terrorist organization.  In his autobiography, 
Hammami answers questions regarding his experiences in Somalia. He confirms that the 
move to Somalia fulfilled his sense of perceived isolation by stating, “I also gained a lot 
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of acquaintances and relationships that are priceless and I have had the honor of knowing 
some of the most righteous men of our times.”326 
C. INITIAL ENGAGEMENT 
As explained above, each individual experienced a sense of perceived isolation 
immediately before they entered the initial engagement phase. Fathali Moghaddam 
explains the most important transformation in an individual’s path to radicalization is his 
or her engagement with the morality of terrorist organizations, where he or she begins to 
see terrorism as a justified strategy.327  Being unable to rectify the perceived isolation 
that they experienced consequently pushed these individuals deeper into radicalization on 
the final path of committing an act of violence. During the initial engagement phase, each 
individual experienced self-imposed isolation in the form of a parallel life.  Parallel lives 
are developed by individuals in order to hide their true intentions through secrecy and 
isolation. Individuals leading parallel lives keep this a secret from even their closest 
family or friends. The use of parallel lives serves multiple purposes. It not only hides 
individuals for operational reasons, but it also reinforces individual’s commitment to the 
cause.  When individuals isolate themselves so completely from friends and family and 
their former lives, they have no outside perspective or competing values.  They become 
more deeply immersed in the cause and anchored solely to their ideology.328  While 
individuals remained dedicated to the cause, this time period also presents contradictive 
motivations. On one hand they must maintain secrecy in order to avoid detection. Yet on 
the other hand, these individuals seek recognition and acknowledgement for their 
“heroic” acts. These individuals must find a balance between remaining secretive and 
fulfilling their need for recognition. The foreknowledge of the recognition they will 
receive for committing an act seemingly helps them maintain secrecy in order to finally 
receive the recognition that they desire. In the initial engagement phase, each individual 
326 al-Amriiki, The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One, 105. 
327 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 162.  
328 Ibid., 165. 
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also made a final outreach to others in hopes of expressing their ideology and gaining 
support for their cause—again making a plea for recognition.  
1. Parallel Lives 
Months before the attack, Timothy McVeigh socially isolated himself for 
operational reasons. This is evident in a letter he wrote to his sister Jennifer in which he 
stated: 
Of course you must realize, then, that I’m not living in Arizona. Why am I 
running? I am trying to keep my path “cool,” so in case someone is 
looking to ‘shut up someone who knows too much’ I will not be easy to 
find.329  
Additionally, weeks prior to the attack McVeigh rented a motel room in Arizona. 
The authors Michel, Herbeck and Telles, explain, “He spent the next twelve days in 
lockdown mode—almost completely alone thinking and planning.”330 This seclusion 
before the attack may have served dual purposes. One, McVeigh was operationally hiding 
to avoid detection, but he may have used this time as one of personal reflection in order 
to prepare himself for the attack and further his devotion to the cause. 
Although it is debatable when Anders Breivik did in fact decide to conduct the 
attack, he spent a considerable amount of time isolated in years prior, hiding his 
intentions and avoiding detection. Breivik spoke extensively of the operational necessity 
in creating a project or an alibi to provide to your family and friends that will “at least 
partly justify your ‘new pattern of activities’ (isolation/travel) while in the planning 
phase.”331 Breivik diminished his interactions with family and friends during his 
planning phase and explains he did not have a desire to create or preserve social 
connections.  
Omar Hammami initially moved to Egypt to live in an Islamic society. However, 
once there, he became disenchanted with his surroundings.  Furthermore, Hammami did 
329 Michel, Herbeck, and Telles, American Terrorist, 196–197. 
330 Ibid., 202. 
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not view Egypt as a pure Islamic society, and found it to be more secular than expected.  
In addition, Hammami had moved to Egypt to attend an Islamic University; however, he 
was not accepted into the program.  He also had a difficult time finding adequate 
employment and housing for his family.  As Hammami became more and more 
disenchanted with their new life in Egypt, he began attending underground mosques and 
spending a significant amount of time in internet cafés. At the same time, he became 
more enthralled by what was occurring in Somalia. Hammami had found a place where 
he could live in a pure Islamic society.  He kept his true intentions and desires of moving 
to Somalia a secret from those closest to him. Eventually, Hammami began to lead a 
parallel life.  Hammami and Daniel Maldonado began secretly planning to move to 
Somalia. Hammami left his wife and child under the guise of looking for work, and he 
moved to Somalia.   
2. Final Outreach 
Each of the individuals in the case studies longed for his voice to be heard and 
longed for others to support his cause.  Throughout his radicalization and subsequent 
status as a terrorist, each man made final attempts to rally support.  These acts reinforce 
the perception of isolation that each felt.  For example, Timothy McVeigh was extremely 
concerned with how he would be remembered after the bombing of Oklahoma City.  He 
pushed to get his biography, The American Terrorist, published before his death in order 
for him to tell his story.  Hours before his attack, Anders Breivik sent a mass email to 
thousands of individuals containing his compendium 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence.  Omar Hammami spent years following his radicalization online 
promoting his story and his cause.  In the end, Hammami produced Part One of his 
autobiography, The Story of an American Jihadi.  Each act displaying each man’s final 
attempt to be understood.   
D. COMMON THEMES 
The above chapter shows that each individual experienced significant periods of 
isolation that greatly affected their radicalization process. There are however, several 
theories that can be useful in explaining the social psychology behind the choices each 
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individual made.  These theories deserve further explanation in order to provide context 
to these individuals’ lives and the choices they made.   
Social identity theory (SIT) provides a framework for understanding the dynamics 
behind the individual membership in a group and group behavior. According to SIT, 
“The experience of belonging to a group is a powerful determinant of the identities of 
most individuals.”332 Therefore, individuals who are isolated, whether that is social, 
emotional or perceived isolation, are then driven to belong to a group. The concept of 
existential psychology also shows that individuals have an innate need to be understood 
and relate to others.  Although Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik are considered 
“lone wolves,” as they did not work on behalf of a terrorist organization, SIT can be 
helpful in understanding their motivations. Group membership becomes part of our 
identity as an individual. Subsequently, the values associated with a group then have 
implications for our feelings of self-worth. Membership in a group, whether that group is 
small or large, must provide a positive sense of self-worth to an individual.  Timothy 
McVeigh left the Army when it no longer provided him the cohesion amongst peers that 
he longed for. McVeigh then immersed himself in the gun show circuit and anti-
government ideologies—areas he deemed as providing him a positive sense of self-worth.  
Anders Breivik left the Progress Party when they no longer provided him with a sense of 
self-worth. The Progress Party would only use democratic means to push out 
multiculturalism, whereas Breivik wanted an armed resistance. Breivik searched for other 
like-minded individuals, eventually finding them online. He additionally fabricated the 
Knights Templar—displaying his need for acceptance in a group.  Omar Hammami acted 
on behalf of a terrorist organization, al-Shabaab. He joined their fight for a true Islamic 
Society—one that Hammami had been in search of.  These individuals had visions of 
ideal societies and refused to conform to real societies. Their avoidance of conformity 
shows that real societies had become their out-group and they were in search of a new in-
group—their ideal societies. McVeigh wanted less government intrusion, Breivik wanted 
multiculturalism driven out of Norway, and Hammami wanted a pure Islamic society. 
332 Brannan and Strindberg, Critical Analysis, 32. 
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They sought to find an in-group that provided them with support and a positive sense of 
self-worth.  SIT is useful in explaining the individuals’ needs to find their in-group.   
It is important to mention an individual’s need for personal mobility.  As 
individuals, the majority of people all occupy the same foundational level—terrorists and 
non-terrorists alike. It is the perception of their environment, relationships and influences 
that drive some people towards radicalization while others do not move down that path. 
An important piece in radicalization is the perception of opportunities people feel they 
have open to them. Isolation plays a large role in that specifically perceived isolation and 
the lack of support felt. If individuals do not feel that they can rectify their perceived 
isolation through normative means, will they then move towards non-normative means in 
order to find support?  Prior research suggests, “that when paths to individual mobility 
are seen to be open, there is far less tendency to attempt non-normative actions.”333 
When these individuals began to become morally engaged with a terrorist mentality, they 
felt as if this was the only viable option, and they could no longer accomplish their goals 
without violence.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The concept of isolation has many different roles throughout the radicalization 
process—many of these roles are overlapping and intertwined. This chapter demonstrated 
the complexity and importance of isolation within the radicalization process. Each 
individual experienced social, perceived, and emotional isolation throughout their lives. 
By thoroughly evaluating these roles and the effects they have on an individual’s 
propensity to become radicalized, this offers additional opportunities for early detection 
or intervention.  It is important to recognize that isolation is necessary in the 
radicalization process in order to maintain secrecy; however, isolation is not sufficient as 
a cause of radicalization. Many individuals self-impose isolation as a means of creativity 
or self-reflection; therefore, it is important to focus on forced isolation with negative  
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connotations and isolation as a means of secrecy. The final chapter will outline the 
information discussed within this thesis including theoretical and policy implications 
















Previously, a limited amount of research had been conducted on the specific role 
of social, emotional, and perceived isolation on the radicalization process.  The lack of 
representation of isolation in radicalization has created a significant knowledge gap in the 
overall study of terrorism. Numerous models of the radicalization process exist, yet the 
role of isolation has previously remained neglected. This thesis focused on whether or not 
isolation played a significant role in an individual’s process towards radicalization. It is 
important to understand the role of isolation in the radicalization process in order to 
effectively counter radicalization and ultimately terrorism.  
Bruce Hoffman, a renowned terrorism expert, explains that new terrorist 
organizations learn from their predecessors.334  These groups learn lessons from former 
comrades who have been killed or apprehended by counter terrorism officials in order to 
avoid detection.335 He continues to explain the success of terrorists is dependent on their 
ability to keep one step ahead of authorities.336  As our adversaries change, so must our 
response. However, this has created a continuous cycle of cat and mouse between 
authorities and adversaries.  Currently, homeland security officials target individuals who 
are already radicalized and may be in the operational phases of conducting or planning an 
attack.  Through the operational aspects of homeland security and law enforcement, 
individuals who pose a threat are removed from the equation through apprehension or 
arrest.  This current strategy effectively eliminates individuals who pose an immediate 
threat; however, those individuals are soon replaced by other like-minded individuals 
intent on causing harm—creating a continuous cycle of threats. Instead, by viewing 
radicalization through a social psychological lens, we may be able to effectively change 
the conditions that contribute to radicalization. If we change the conditions that  
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contribute to radicalization, we may be able to stop the cycle.  By understanding the role 
that isolation plays in radicalization, we are one step closer to understanding the 
conditions that promote radicalization.   
Without first understanding the radicalization process and understanding all of the 
contributing factors to radicalization, counter terrorism officials may struggle in 
effectively intercepting individuals who are intent on causing harm. Instead by 
understanding pre-disposing risk factors, we may be able to effectively change the 
environment that promotes radicalization. Through the case studies, it has been shown 
that each of these terrorists experienced isolation (perceived, emotional or social) 
throughout their radicalization process—highlighting an important factor in the 
radicalization process.   
B. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS 
This thesis was based on the analytic assessment of three case studies of 
individuals who have committed acts of terrorism.  The case studies of Timothy 
McVeigh, Anders Breivik, and Omar Hammami demonstrate that isolation does have a 
role in the radicalization process.  Each individual experienced isolation throughout his 
life and on his path of radicalization, although each manifested in very different ways.  
The initial involvement phase of radicalization illustrates that each individual 
experienced all three types of isolation—social, emotional and perceived isolation. The 
initial engagement phase demonstrated that each individual was isolated out of necessity, 
as means to hide operational activities in preparation for an attack and in order to hide 
their true intentions by establishing a “parallel life.”  Isolation is difficult to measure. 
Social isolation is easier to measure as it is characterized as social connectedness—a 
measurable concept.  However, perceived isolation and emotional isolation are both 
subjective experiences. In order to conduct these case studies, this study relied on the 
personal experiences of the individuals in order to determine if isolation played a role in 
their radicalization.  
Radicalization is not a one-size-fits-all approach and terrorism is a complex multi-
dimensional process. Currently, several schools of thought exist, all offering differing 
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opinions on the contributing factors of radicalization. Radicalization research should not 
simply encompass one specific theory or discipline.337 Radicalization should be viewed 
as a dynamic process that encompasses both individual and situational factors.  Veldhuis 
and Staun note, “Only if we account for the dependencies between the individual and his 
environment can we begin to explain why some people radicalise, while others do 
not.”338  This view, including psychological and social psychological factors, accounts 
for individual aspects but also considers the context and environment in which an 
individual operates in.339 A social psychological and inter-disciplinary view of 
radicalization and isolation was used in order to research the relationship between the 
two. Although there are varying opinions on radicalization and numerous radicalization 
models, the case studies conducted show differing phases of isolation within the 
radicalization process. Because isolation was identified as a common theme throughout 
the radicalization of these individuals, we may now be positioned to effectively bridge 
the gap between the varying opinions on radicalization by highlighting contributing 
factors. 
The concept of isolation is multifaceted and multi-dimensional. This thesis 
demonstrates that isolation can manifest in multiple ways and have numerous outcomes. 
It can be self-imposed or forced upon individuals, each resulting in differing outcomes.  
Peer rejection, the inability to connect with peers and family, and the perceived lack of 
support from others, all has drastic effects on individuals—demonstrating the negative 
aspects of forced isolation. However, many people who isolate themselves do so for 
creative, spiritual, and other constructive reasons. Isolation does not always have negative 
connotations. Consider artists, writers, or monks who have isolated themselves for clarity 
and positive reasons. However, when isolation was forced on these individuals it had an 
impact on them and drastically altered their perspective on life. Isolation played a role in 
the opportunities these individuals felt they had available to them. Peer rejection or fear 
of rejection, also altered the way in which they viewed their life and future. Lack of 
337 Canter, The Faces of Terrorism, 1.  
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physical or emotional connections with others impacted the support network they felt 
they had available to them. The need to belong to a group and the existential need to 
relate to others also impacted the decisions they made. The concept of isolation should be 
viewed from a social psychological standpoint and consider the overall context of 
individual and situational factors. This thesis is not intended to argue that isolation is a 
cause of radicalization; rather, its intent is to use the case studies of McVeigh, Breivik 
and Hammami in order to demonstrate that isolation was a contributing factor in their 
radicalization. Isolation cannot be used as a standalone concept. Isolation in itself is not a 
sufficient cause of radicalization. However, isolation in conjunction with individual and 
situational determinants may have an effect on the path an individual chooses to take. 
Many people are isolated for many different reasons, the majority of which never enter 
into the process of radicalization.   
C. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Ultimately, the radicalization process is different for all people at all times and 
individuals become terrorists in many different ways and for many different reasons.340 
In order to effectively counter radicalization, we must decide if radicalization matters in 
the absence of violence.  In the overall study of terrorism and radicalization, one critical 
question remains: Why does one individual become a terrorist and the other does not? 
Psychologist John Horgan suggests in the study of radicalization that it might be 
beneficial to establish “predisposing risk factors” for involvement in terrorism. These 
predisposing risk factors may be beneficial serving as a prelude to a formal risk 
assessment for actual involvement in terrorism. Horgan indicates, “the presence of some 
emotional vulnerability, in terms of feelings of anger, alienation and disenfranchisement” 
could be used as pre-disposing risk factors.341  A sense of dissatisfaction or 
disillusionment with the individual’s current persona or activity may be helpful in 
understanding how an individual progresses into radicalization and ultimately 
340 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” 8.  
341 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways,” 84–85. 
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terrorism.342 The case studies in prior chapters show that each individual was dissatisfied 
with their current status.  Can the establishment of predisposing risk factors, to include 
isolation, be beneficial in counter radicalization?  
Theoretically speaking, Bruce Hoffman suggests there are five objectives of 
terrorism. Terrorists seek to fulfill these objectives in order to eventually affect political 
change. The five objectives to terrorism are “Attention, Acknowledgement, Recognition, 
Authority and Governance.”343 He contends that some terrorists have been successful in 
attaining the first three objectives: attention, acknowledgement, and recognition. 
However, very few have been able to obtain the last two.344 By focusing on the first three 
objectives, can this provide insight into who becomes a terrorist? If terrorists seek 
attention, acknowledgement and recognition can the aforementioned “predisposing risk 
factors” be used to attempt to provide a profile of those that might engage in terrorism? 
Does an individual’s dissatisfaction with their level of support and interaction with others 
make them more open to influence?  If individuals who are isolated, seek attention, 
acknowledgement and recognition do they view their only opportunity to achieve these 
objectives through terrorism?   
If answered, these questions can drastically alter radicalization research and the 
direction taken in future radicalization research. Determining the balance between 
theoretical implications and policy implications in regard to radicalization is challenging. 
If counter terrorism officials have the objective to prevent terrorism through the 
interception or apprehension of individuals who are already radicalized, who then can 
attempt to change the environments that promote radicalization? It is not illegal to be 
isolated, nor is it illegal to be “radical.” Therefore, isolation cannot be viewed as a 
standalone indicator of radicalization or terrorism. It is imperative the symptoms of 
isolation be coupled with other indicators of radicalization and not just specifically focus 
on isolated individuals. Bringing in the factor of isolation as a “pre-disposing” factor, has 
not previously been involved in the radicalization process or in homeland security 
342 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 89. 
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operations. Through the study of isolation in relation to the radicalization process, we 
have provided additional insight into the overall study of radicalization. Contributing to 
the overall study of radicalization may provide counter terrorism officials the opportunity 
to utilize a new perspective on countering radicalization.  However, before this can be 
done, additional research on the topic of isolation and radicalization is necessary.  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis was conducted to demonstrate that isolation does have a role in 
radicalization. It is clear that isolation as a form of secrecy or parallel life is part of the 
radicalization process. Determining the exact role and influence of social, emotional, and 
perceived isolation is difficult. However, if future research is conducted in determining 
the motivations behind committing an act of terrorism and additional research is 
conducted on the exact effects of isolation on an individual, it may help determine 
whether or not social, emotional and perceived isolation affects and individual’s 
propensity to become radicalized.  Additional research is necessary in this area to 
determine exactly what role isolation does play. If additional research, such as 
sociological, psychological, or biological research, is conducted on this topic, it may have 
many implications in the future.  This additional research may provide additional insight 
into the driving factors of radicalization and may assist in moving one step closer to 
changing the environment that promotes terrorism.  
This thesis highlighted several additional areas in need of research. As we move 
further into the information age, the role of isolation and the internet needs to be explored 
more in depth.  Does the internet provide a means of communication for those isolated 
individuals whose voices are not typically heard?  Does an isolated individual find 
comfort and support on the internet? How does this affect social identity theory and an 
individual’s need to belong? Are isolated individuals more susceptible to charismatic 
leaders?  If future research is conducted on these topics, it may drastically alter how we 




understanding of the contributing factors of radicalization and the environments that 
promote radicalization, we may be able to alter policy strategies in order to more 
effectively counter terrorism.   
E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Currently, the United States does not have a standard radicalization framework 
utilized by all agencies involved in homeland security efforts.  The lack of a standard 
framework throughout the intelligence community and law enforcement poses a 
significant issue and knowledge gap within agencies tasked with countering terrorism. 
With the intention of more effectively countering terrorism, we must first understand the 
radicalization process. In order to better recognize the role of factors such as isolation and 
to use it as a “pre-disposing risk factor,” agencies need a more effective framework 
around which to organize their collaboration.  Without a standard radicalization 
framework guiding the intelligence community and law enforcement, it makes the task of 
countering radicalization and terrorism quite challenging. The efforts of establishing pre-
disposing factors and integrating them into a standard framework may eventually provide 
an opportunity for early intervention in the radicalization process.  
By viewing the effects of isolation coupled with other indicators of radicalization, 
we may be able to effectively reach individuals before they enter into a point of 
engagement or full radicalization. An effective outreach campaign may better position 
homeland security officials to prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring. 
Understanding the role of isolation in radicalization may also afford the United States the 
ability to create a counter-radicalization strategy. When viewing the counter-
radicalization strategies of other countries, the United States can learn lessons on the 
benefits of having a standard radicalization framework used throughout the country. This 
may also afford the opportunity for not only a counter-radicalization strategy, but a 
disengagement strategy as well.  The suggested future research may have drastic effects 
on the current homeland security policy strategies, with the momentous goal of trying to 
eventually reach early intervention, in order to disrupt the cycle of terrorism. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
This thesis displayed the multifaceted roles that isolation plays in the 
radicalization process.  It demonstrated that the initial involvement phase displayed signs 
of social, emotional, and perceived isolation. The initial engagement phase demonstrated 
the ability of individuals to live in secrecy through “parallel lives.”  It is imperative 
homeland security officials fully understand isolation and the effects it has on an 
individual and how it affects an individual’s propensity to become radicalized. It is also 
necessary for officials to understand the ability of isolation to maintain an individual’s 
true intentions of committing a terrorist attack.  Through the comprehensive 
understanding of the contributing factors of radicalization homeland security officials 
will be better positioned to effectively counter radicalization.  This research is meant to 
highlight isolation as a contributing factor to radicalization; not prove cause and effect.  
By highlighting the importance of isolation, this study has brought up future areas of 
research that may be valuable in establishing predisposing risk factors of isolation. By 
focusing on intervention and preventative measures in regard to isolation, it may be 
possible to ultimately prevent radicalization and terrorism. By viewing radicalization as a 
complex process that encompasses both individual and situational factors we can attempt 
to determine how and why individuals move from seemingly normal backgrounds to 
committing acts of terror.  This social psychological viewpoint is beneficial in 
understanding how individuals move towards a path of violence.  Studying human 
behavior and understanding the motivation behind committing acts of violence can be 
beneficial in not only terrorism research but may also provide insight into individuals 
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